TEL AVIV – In the midst of the ongoing Israeli war on the
Gaza Strip and the intense focus on the ‘next day,’ Israel may be overlooking a
series of pressing challenges that lie ahead. From potential social and
political upheaval to
security concerns in both the northern and southern
regions, these looming obligations remain significant, yet they seem to be
absent from the forefront of Israeli consciousness amidst the current
preoccupation with war, Jo24 reported.
اضافة اعلان
Despite the shock of military and security failures, there
is a growing sense of optimism among Israelis that the war will forge a unified
framework driven by a shared perception of collective threats. This hopeful
outlook could pave the way for the establishment of a 'war council,'
integrating both adversaries of Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu,
Benny Gantz, and Gadi Eisenkot into the government.
However, the increasing frequency of political disagreements
is leading Israelis to realize that the divide between political rivals runs
deeper than what the war could bridge. Against this backdrop, six critical
challenges awaiting Israel in the aftermath of the war can be identified. It is
highly likely that once the ceasefire is declared, both Gantz and Eisenkot will
step back from the government, leaving it to revert to its previous form as a
purely right-wing administration.
The first
challenge: the internal political crisis and the fate of the government
coalition
Prior to the war, the internal crisis escalated rapidly. As
Israel was heading towards the war, the
Supreme Court convened sessions to
deliberate on the 'reasonableness' clause law, a measure enacted by the
coalition to restrict the Supreme Court's authority in adjudicating the
government's decisions.
Right-wing leaders threatened non-compliance with the
court's ruling if the law was nullified, while opposition leaders vowed
defiance against the government if it rejected the court's decision. Although
the war temporarily halted the dispute, the court ultimately annulled the law
in early 2024.
Coalition leaders refrained from issuing a strong response,
but they made their intentions clear regarding the court post-war. Right-wing
Knesset member Simcha Rothman stated, "The Supreme Court has chosen its
battle, and changes will be made to the judicial system after the war."
These stances highlight the post-war landscape characterized
by two conflicting legitimacies: the legitimacy of the court and the legitimacy
of the Knesset. With Israel lacking a constitution or laws regulating such
disputes, there is ample room for each party to interpret according to its mood
and political interests. The danger lies in these interpretations potentially
undermining the legitimacy of the political system, paving the way for a
constitutional crisis once the war concludes.
Aside from the war scenario, the Supreme Court was scheduled
to convene on October 22, 2023, to address appeals filed against Minister of
Justice Yariv Levin due to his delay in forming the judicial appointment
committee. While the controversy surrounding this issue was overshadowed by the
war, it is expected to be a contentious matter in the post-war internal
conflict.
Furthermore, the government experienced internal disputes
before and during the war. It began with Netanyahu's dismissal of
Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant, followed by his reinstatement due to his support for the
judicial reform project. Disputes over war management arose, with Netanyahu and
Gallant holding separate press conferences, and Gallant withdrawing from a
government session due to a disagreement with Netanyahu.
Another significant issue threatening the coalition's
continuity is the conscription law. Haredi parties insist on passing
legislation exempting yeshiva students from military service, aiming to enact
the law by the end of 2024 at the latest. Secular components within the
coalition, represented by left-wing parties, oppose this law, viewing it as a
serious threat to the 'people's army' model. Despite attempts to reconcile, the
deadlock over passing the law persists, as indicated by
Minister of Housing and Construction Yitzhak Goldknopf's statement, "The government's existence is tied to the
conscription law."
The second
challenge: Netanyahu's political future
Netanyahu's significance lies in his role as the sole figure
who consolidates right-wing leadership. Should Netanyahu be removed from the
political arena, the Likud party is poised to experience substantial defections
and undergo a period of political fragility, impacting the entire right-wing
coalition. Conversely, the absence of a unifying figure within the left
suggests that Israel teeters on the edge of a leadership crisis.
Netanyahu's political future faces multiple threats,
primarily stemming from corruption allegations and the court's decision to
delay the implementation of a law designed to prevent the Prime Minister's
dismissal. While this law was enacted by the Knesset to shield Netanyahu from
ousting, the primary concern lies in the ethical and 'nationalistic'
responsibilities regarding the war.
Netanyahu aims to leverage military strategy by prolonging
and intensifying the war to achieve two objectives. Firstly, he seeks to secure
a military victory or at least cultivate a perception of accomplishment to
counterbalance the narrative of failure and defeat on October 7, 2023.
Secondly, he intends to capitalize on the temporal gap between the events of
October 7 and the war's conclusion, as this distance allows Netanyahu to
mitigate the anger and resentment prevalent among Israelis.
It is improbable that Netanyahu will yield to pressure and
explicitly admit his responsibility for the events of October 7. Instead, he
will utilize his media influence to attribute the defeat to a single cause,
primarily focusing on the leadership of the
Israeli Occupation Forces (
IOF).
Furthermore, it is even less likely that he will heed calls for resignation and
government dissolution.
However, Netanyahu's resilience in the face of pressure will
ultimately hinge on the outcomes of the war and Israel's ability to achieve
tangible accomplishments.
The third
challenge: the relationship between the political and military levels
For decades, the relationship between the political and
military spheres has been characterized by orderliness, with the military being
subordinate to the political leadership and refraining from intervening in or
influencing the political process.
Netanyahu voiced his dissatisfaction with the IOF conveying
a narrative implying that its readiness was adversely affected by the crisis.
This led Netanyahu to criticize the Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, with both
exchanging accusations regarding the impact of judicial changes on the IOF’s
efficiency. Subsequently, several Likud members launched attacks on Halevi. The
Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth then remarked that both Netanyahu and Halevi
were on a collision course.
The clash during the war shifted to another trajectory with
seemingly no resolution other than confrontation. It commenced with Netanyahu's
tendency to evade responsibility for the failure on
October 7, followed by
attacks from right-wing ministers on Halevi for establishing an investigation
committee comprising retired generals close to the left-wing faction.
Furthermore, this dispute, instigated by politics and
sustained by the war, hints at a more strained relationship after its
conclusion. As discussions arise regarding the war's accountability, it becomes
apparent that the governing norms of their relationship have been materially
compromised.
The fourth
challenge: security and military challenges
One likely outcome of the war is that the nature of security
and military challenges, rules of engagement, and deterrence equations will
change. Intuitively, the war's results will determine whether they favor Israel
or the opposite.
In the
Gaza Strip, the IOF will face a different situation.
Since its options in the war range between victory and defeat, the
opportunities window in the victory scenario is limited to dismantling Hamas's
military structure in the strip and ending its rule. At best, it extends to
eliminating Hamas, not just as an idea but in actuality and effectiveness.
In such a scenario, Hamas could shape the threat pattern
through decentralized operations. Being non-governing, it can act more freely.
The IOF would then have to confront prolonged attrition operations,
necessitating the deployment of large forces along the Gaza border and doubling
security efforts.
The defeat scenario carries even more dangerous challenges.
Hamas retains its military infrastructure, can build its capabilities, grows
more confident in threatening Israel, and conducts major successful military
operations, while increasing its self-assurance in its inability to be
eradicated or have its military capabilities dismantled.
In this situation, the deterrence equation, a fundamental
pillar of the IOF and Israel's existence will collapse in a way that is
difficult to repair, not only in Hamas's awareness but also in the awareness of
Israelis themselves. Society’s confidence in the IOF will plummet to its lowest
levels, and the IOF will realize it is unable to achieve victory against what
it categorizes as its ‘weakest enemies.’
Regarding Iran and Hezbollah, an Israeli victory will send a
firm deterrence message to both. However, they stand to benefit from both
scenarios. If the IOF succeeds in Gaza, it will be preoccupied with draining
operations, diverting its attention from them. In the event of failure, Israel
will be at its worst in the regional deterrence balance. This will embolden
Hezbollah and Iran to advance their projects, becoming bolder in dealing with
Israel.
The fifth
challenge: economic Crisis
Negative indicators have emerged for the Israeli economy,
running parallel to the political crisis and subsequent war. These indicators
include a significant drop in the expected growth rate from four percent to two
percent, the depreciation of the shekel against the dollar, and a sharp decline
in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange to levels not seen since the 2008 global crisis.
Estimates project the cost of the war to amount to $51
billion. Although Israel possesses the economic resources necessary for
recovery, achieving this recovery hinges on political and security stability,
which appears elusive in the aftermath of the war. Consequently, the likelihood
of exacerbating the crisis outweighs that of recovery.
The sixth
challenge: Israel's international legitimacy
At the outset of the war, Israeli propaganda intensified
every discourse or depiction of victimization to garner maximum support.
However, the emergence of images depicting killings and destruction against
civilians, including children, tilted the balance against the Israeli
narrative.
Israel realizes it needs time to repair its image in
international public opinion, especially in the West, to continue garnering the
crucial support necessary to address its economic and political challenges.
Nevertheless, with diplomatic efforts and some time, Western-Israeli relations
can return to their pre-war state.
Regionally, Israel faces its toughest challenge in the
normalization process with Saudi Arabia. Due to the war, Israel finds itself in
a weaker negotiating position, and at best, this process will take longer than
it would have without the war.
The most substantial challenge remains the potential
repercussions of an International Court ruling if Israel were to be convicted.
These repercussions could extend practically on several levels, notably
reinforcing the idea of international boycotts, freezing, or severing
diplomatic relations with Israel by some countries, with slim chances of
imposing military and economic sanctions on it.
These challenges awaiting Israel do not seem to be seriously
considered in the Israeli mindset preoccupied with the war and concerns about
the post-war situation in Gaza. It overlooks the unprecedented social and
political upheaval Israel will face, along with security challenges in the
north and south, a suffocating economy, and eroding international legitimacy
and status.
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