While Russia and Iran
do not always concur, their status as pariahs of the West has pushed them to
work as an “axis of the sanctioned”. One way this has materialized is through
the International North-South
Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-km network of
road, rail, and shipping routes designed to move freight between India, Iran,
Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe.
اضافة اعلان
Conceived in 2000 but never
finished, the INSTC is increasingly being viewed by both countries as a
solution to Western isolation. The question now is whether it can be built.
A problem for
strategic planners on both sides is that the trade corridor would pass through
Azerbaijan — which Daesh has threatened to destroy. Indeed, relations between
the neighboring Shia nations have grown tense in recent months, as both countries
have held military drills along the Aras River, which separates Iran from
Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Once operational, “15 million to 30 million tonnes of cargo can be transported from the territory of Azerbaijan through the (INSTC) alone.”
And yet, pragmatism
may nonetheless prevail. In September, Iran’s foreign ministry called the INSTC “crucial” for regional
economic activity, and this month, following a tripartite meeting in Turkey,
Iranian Parliament Speaker Muhammed Bakir Kalibaf said “some
misunderstandings with the Republic of Azerbaijan have… disappeared recently.”
Baku, for its part,
would benefit economically from the INSTC, and according to President
Ilham Aliyev, infrastructure work related to the transport corridor in
Azerbaijan has been completed. Once
operational, “15 million to 30 million tonnes of cargo can be transported
from the territory of Azerbaijan through the (INSTC) alone,” Aliyev said.
The project’s
potential
Moscow and Tehran
have committed significant resources to making the transport corridor a
reality. Officials recently discussed completion of the
Astara-Rasht-Qazvin railway, a transport corridor that will connect
existing railways of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to the INSTC. Overall, Moscow
and Tehran plan to invest as much as $25 billion in the regional
network.
Some aspects of the
project are already moving. For instance, this month Russia and Iran signed a
contract for construction of a cargo ship to operate out
of the Caspian Sea port of Solyanka, in the southern Russian city of Astrakhan.
This suggests that the two countries aim to build not only the land route, but
also to strengthen the Caspian transportation network.
Russia and Iran have
also discussed the creation of a transport-logistics hub in Iran’s
Bandar Abbas port, while the topic of Caspian Sea cooperation was on the
agenda for a meeting this week between the countries’ foreign ministers.
Moscow likely views a
land link with Iran as a better investment — given that Western countries
control most major sea routes and have imposed restrictions on Russian ships.
Nonetheless, the Kremlin is keeping its options open. Earlier this month,
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Iranian counterpart agreed on the need
for “consistent implementation of mutually beneficial projects in the energy,
transport, and logistics sectors”, according to a readout of the call.
Barriers to
implementation
If completed, the
INSTC would help Russian and Iranian companies reorient to eastern markets,
circumventing some of the sanctions that are strangling their operations. But
creating a new transport route is far from guaranteed; there are plenty of
obstacles that continue to stand in the way of an operational corridor.
The successful functioning of the INSTC would depend on whether Asian countries, namely India and the Gulf states, would agree to do any serious business along transit hubs managed by Russia and Iran.
For starters, it
remains uncertain whether Russia, despite being one of the major protagonists,
can guarantee security on its section of the transportation route. The Russian
government plans to build roads around
Khasavyurt and Derbent — strategically important cities located in Dagestan, a
restive region that has faced waves of anti-government protests.
If Moscow loses in
Ukraine, separatist tendencies in Dagestan, where ethnic Russians
make up only 3.6 percent of the population, will undoubtedly grow, impacting the fate
of the INSTC.
Second, given the
current geopolitical circumstances, it is unlikely that European nations will
use Russia and Iran as transit routes to India. In a similar vein, the
successful functioning of the INSTC would depend on whether Asian countries,
namely India and the Gulf states, would agree to do any serious business along
transit hubs managed by Russia and Iran.
Third, it will take
time to build the necessary transport infrastructure, and it is unclear whether
Moscow, struggling with Western sanctions and bogged down in Ukraine, has the
capacity to complete such ambitious projects.
Finally, the US and
its allies can always find new ways to prevent Moscow and Tehran from
completing their endeavor — through more sanctions, sabotage, or other means.
Mere aspirations?
At this point, the
obstacles to a fully functional INSTC appear insurmountable. Thus, Russia and
Iran will likely focus more on developing closer bilateral ties — be it in
the fields of aviation or aerospace — aware that a
regional transport corridor is heavily dependent on other regional
actors.
While a trade route
to bypass Western sanctions will remain high on agendas in Moscow and Tehran,
for now, the INSTC appears more aspirational than possible.
Nikola Mikovic is a
political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign policies
of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and
“pipeline politics”. Syndication Bureau.
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