Unlike the two
post-Ottoman political projects of the Hashemites and modern Lebanon that this
series has so far presented, the political project of Grand Syria has never
materialized.
اضافة اعلان
Grand Syria is a
term that has appeared in different eras, always referring to the geographic
land extending from the Taurus mountains at the Levant’s natural borders with
Asia Minor, all the way south to Egypt’s Sinai. The definition of the term was
always vague, something to be expected from a notion that has always sprung up
from conceptions about culture, but that never came to pass in any political
entity.
Yet, Grand Syria
has continued to inspire scores of thinkers and politicians who regarded that
geographic space – effectively the bulk of the Levant – as comprising a single
cultural and social milieu, and that ought to manifest in a Levantine political
unity.
This makes the notion of Grand Syria different from Arab nationalism. In this view, Grand Syria was a cultural reality before being a political project.
Antoun Saadeh was the most prominent 20th
century thinker who advocated a single Syrian cultural and political identity
in the whole of the Levant. Saadeh was executed in Lebanon in 1949, but his
thought has for decades inspired a number of political movements in Syria and
Lebanon.
His thought was anchored on the idea that the
Levantine way of living, quite similar societal traditions, shared history, and
even their close variations of Arabic accents bring the vast majority of
Levantine communities together, and, equally important, make the region as a
whole distinct from the rest of the Arab world and al-Mashreq.
This makes the notion of Grand Syria different
from Arab nationalism. In this view, Grand Syria was a cultural reality before
being a political project.
Saadeh’s thought, and that of his followers,
was never popular amongst the Levant’s political elite. But to some extent,
elements of the notion of Grand Syria seeped into that of the Syrian branch of
al-Baath (the party of Resurrection, which controlled Syria and Iraq for
decades).
However, for Assad, Grand Syria was not merely a cultural umbrella that ought to be expressed in a political project; rather it was a sphere of Syrian influence in the Levant.
President Hafez al-Assad, who ruled Syria from
1970 until his death in 2000, was at heart an Arab nationalist, an ideology he
remained faithful to until the end of his life. In his policies, however,
especially in his successful attempts in the 1980s and 1990s to extend Syria’s
influence over Lebanon and within many Palestinian political factions, Hafez
al-Assad was a de-facto promoter of Grand Syria.
However, for Assad, Grand Syria was not merely
a cultural umbrella that ought to be expressed in a political project; rather
it was a sphere of Syrian influence in the Levant.
Assad certainly saw Syria’s prominent role in
the Levant’s history as well as its demographic size – by far larger than those
of other countries in the region – as anchors for his ambitions for his
country, regime, and family. But Assad’s view was also anchored on a historical
view of Syria as having responsibilities and prerogatives in the Levant, which
stem not only from its demography and history but also from its role in the
region’s geopolitics, as well as from, his view, its custodianship of the region’s
core cultural identity.
Despite their differences, Saadeh, Assad, and
all proponents of Grand Syria in its variations shared particularly hostile
views of the West, especially Britain and France. In their schools of thought,
Western rule was much more calamitous to the region than four centuries of
Ottoman rule, because, in their view, the Ottomans, despite their often highly
oppressive machinations of power and their often rejection of modernization,
had built their rule on unifying the Levant and assuaging the differences between
its communities.
In this view, Grand Syria was an overarching identity that transcends antiquated sectarian affinities. Not surprisingly, the most ardent proponents of Grand Syria were often assertively secular.
By contrast, in their view, the main success
of Western colonialism in the region was that it managed, in a relatively short
period of time, to bring to the surface and emphasize the differences between
Levantine communities. And so, in this line of thinking, Grand Syria was a form
of regional nationalism that aimed to fill the vacuum that the fall of the
Ottomans had created, as opposed to Western presence, that the Grand Syrianism
saw as dividing and conquering the Levant, largely along sectarian lines.
Grand Syria was also conceptually against –
and often condescending towards – Levantine sectarianism, one of the defining
social characteristics of Syria and Lebanon. In this view, Grand Syria was an
overarching identity that transcends antiquated sectarian affinities. Not
surprisingly, the most ardent proponents of Grand Syria were often assertively
secular.
Grand Syria’s failure to take hold of any
Levantine country deprived it of the momentum that other political projects –
such as those of the Hashemites or Arab nationalism – acquired. Still, Grand
Syria has left the Levant with three important legacies.
The first was a sense of victimization. Grand
Syria remains in the minds of many, especially Leftist groups in Lebanon and
Syria, as an unfulfilled ideal, the true cultural frame of reference that the
West and sectarian forces in the region had conspired against. Victimization
continues to give Grand Syria an appeal among groups of young Levantines,
especially given the fraught and problematic recent past of both Syria and
Lebanon.
The second is a notable presence in Levantine
academic and media circles. Some of Saadeh’s disciples and admirers came to
hold highly influential positions in some of the leading academic institutions
of Syria and Lebanon and become prominent voices in some of the most successful
media outlets in the region. This is why, despite its relatively niche nature
as an ideology, Grand Syria continues to find new interpretations in some of
the most successful Syrian and Lebanese media.
Perhaps it is the last of all Levantine nationalist, Left-leaning ideologies of the century since the fall of the Ottomans that continues to inspire its adherents with a fiery fervor and devotedness to the project that has never come to pass.
The last legacy of Grand Syria is a form of
intellectual passion. Perhaps it is the last of all Levantine nationalist,
Left-leaning ideologies of the century since the fall of the Ottomans that
continues to inspire its adherents with a fiery fervor and devotedness to the
project that has never come to pass.
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