With the world focused on the war in Ukraine, China has been busy engaging in
diplomacy with neighboring countries, especially in South Asia. During the last
10 days of March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Pakistan,
Afghanistan, India, and Nepal; attended the Council of Foreign Ministers
meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation; and hosted a series of
international conferences on Afghanistan.
اضافة اعلان
Wang’s trip to India is particularly noteworthy.
Memories of bloodshed in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, where Chinese and Indian
soldiers clashed in mid-2020, killing dozens, are still fresh. Given this, the
high-profile visit by Wang inevitably leads many to wonder whether China has
ulterior motives in engaging with India, or whether China-India relations, once
believed broken beyond repair, are getting a new lease on life.
The answer may be a bit of both.
China has two primary motives for engaging with
India now. The most immediate is the Ukraine situation and a shared pro-Russia
neutrality between Beijing and New Delhi. Both China and India abstained from
the March 2 UN General Assembly resolution demanding Russia to immediately end
its military operation in Ukraine. The abstentions are deeply rooted in both
countries’ relationship with Moscow.
Indeed, China’s “no limits” cooperation with Russia,
a term coined during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to Beijing in
February, has prompted international outcry over China’s acquiescence, or even
tacit support, of Russian aggression. The core of China’s ties to Russia are
energy, market access, and a desire “to withstand sanctions and contest
American global leadership”, according to Daniel Russel of the Asia Society.
Similarly, India is dependent on Russian arms, and
its silence on Russian behaviors has also been met with tremendous pressure,
especially from the US. The Biden administration has tried to bolster India’s
strategic position in the Indo-Pacific through mechanisms such as the QUAD, a
security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
The Chinese have clearly identified an opportunity
to bridge the Sino-India divide — not just to repair relations but also to
build a common position against Western demands that both countries take more
assertive actions on Russia. Beijing has gone as far as to suggest that Washington’s
“bullying behaviors” have brought India and China closer by creating the change
needed for the “rewarming of ties between the two countries”.
The second factor in China’s outreach to India is
Afghanistan. Since the withdrawal of US troops last August, China’s influence
in the country has grown, as has its economic and security interests. In recent
weeks, China has played host to three meetings about Afghanistan’s future. But
while India also has significant stakes in Afghanistan’s development, it has
not been included in any of these Chinese-led gatherings. Pakistan — one of
India’s top security concerns — participated in all three. If China’s leaders
hope to use Russia’s war in Ukraine as a pretext to renew friendship with
India, they must engage New Delhi on issues of mutual interest, like
Afghanistan.
That said, it is
not clear that China’s olive branch to India will be accepted. India has not
moved on from the humiliation and antagonism of the border clashes in 2020,
when China made advances into the disputed Himalayan region (and killed 20
Indian soldiers in the process). While Beijing argues that border disputes
should not derail bilateral ties, for many Indians, ending China’s border
aggression is a precondition for the renormalization of relations.
Even if India juggles between its alignment with the US and Russia, that by no means translates into a desire to align with or rely on China.
China’s calculation is more expedient than
emotional; it views the war in Ukraine as an exploitable moment to revamp ties
with India. But even if India-US relations suffer a temporary setback due to
New Delhi’s acquiescence to Russia, it will not remove or alleviate China’s
status as a top national security threat for India. Moreover, India’s desire to
maintain ties to both Washington and Moscow is at least partially aimed at
checking China’s regional ambition and aggressive behavior.
In this sense,
Beijing’s hope to exploit Delhi’s strategic ambiguity is misplaced. China might
view it as necessary to try, but the impact will be limited due to the
asymmetry of the Chinese and Indian national security threat perceptions. After
all, China’s biggest threat is the US, and India’s biggest threats are China
and Pakistan. Even if India juggles between its alignment with the US and
Russia, that by no means translates into a desire to align with or rely on
China.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang’s first trip to India
since the 2020 border clash carries important significance. At a minimum, it
shows that China is eager to rally support for its position on Russia in the
Ukraine war and is consequently willing to reach out to unlikely partners such
as India. But one must wonder whether such outreach reflects Chinese wishful
thinking or even naiveté. Beijing does not seem to have come to terms with the
fundamental damage the border clashes have done to India’s trust in China and
its confidence in their bilateral relations.
That damage will take years, if not decades, to
repair. So, while the war in Ukraine might provide China with an opening for
reengaging with India, Beijing’s diplomatic overtures will likely fall on deaf
ears.
The writer is director of the China program and
co-director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC.
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