As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its second week, Turkey finds
itself in an unenviable position, entangled geographically, economically,
politically, and militarily with the war’s protagonists. Amid a zero-sum
conflict for both sides, the choices Ankara makes now will anger or disappoint
one or the other – a calculus that will only become more complicated as the
conflict drags on.
اضافة اعلان
For President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the challenges
start with the fact that Turkey belongs to the NATO alliance, which Russian
President Vladimir Putin cited as a key reason to initiate military operations.
While explicitly refusing to intervene directly, NATO has mobilized its
considerable political power to display a united front against Russia.
Turkey is being pulled in three different
directions: toward Russia, Ukraine, and the Western-led NATO consensus. The
latter is particularly fraught, especially because of Turkey’s recent purchase
of sophisticated Russian anti-aircraft S-400 missiles and Erdogan’s descent
into authoritarianism.
Turkey’s economic ties to Ukraine and Russia are
also extensive. It imports almost 45 percent of its natural gas needs from
Russia and 70 percent of its wheat (while Ukraine supplies another 15 percent
of the grain). Equally important, Turkey is a top summer destination for
Russian and Ukrainian tourists, with 5 million visiting annually. Already faced
with a balance-of-payments crisis, the collapse of Turkey’s summer travel
season could have severe repercussions for its economy.
Meanwhile, Turkey had been selling drones to Ukraine
– much to the displeasure of Moscow – which have proven effective on numerous
battlefields, including the current one. Kyiv even announced on Wednesday that
it had just received a new shipment. The drones are a source of pride among
Turks and proof of Turkish electronic sophistication. But by continuing to
export them to Ukraine, Turkey will only further aggravate Russia.
There are other areas where Turkey and Russia are
either at odds or where Ankara is dependent on Moscow’s goodwill to achieve its
strategic goals.
Syria is the most problematic. There, Russia has
been supporting Bashar Al-Assad, who remains in power because of Russian
intervention, while Turkey had been supporting the opposition. Still, the
Kremlin has permitted a degree of freedom to Turkish operations against Syrian
Kurds, whom Ankara accuses of being allies with their own Kurdish
insurrectionists. For the Turks who have already invaded sections of
traditional Syrian Kurdish territory, preventing the emergence of any Kurdish
political entity in northern Syria is a strategic imperative.
Geography is another challenge. As per the 1936
Montreux Convention, Turkey governs the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits into
the Black Sea, a point of contention for both Ukraine and Russia, which are
Black Sea powers. Turkey to date has administered the convention ably and
fairly; it would have preferred to be kept out of this conflict. Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelensky, however, asked the Turks to invoke the “war”
clauses of the convention, thereby preventing the transit of warships. Turkey
complied on February 27, calling Russia’s incursion into Ukraine a “war” and
vowing to close the straits to Russian vessels.
Zelensky’s plea was more political – getting Turkey
to take a position – than strategic. Now, the straits are closed to warships
from all other nations, including NATO members. An unintended consequence may
be that future relief supplies to Ukraine will not be escorted by allied
navies.
At the very beginning, Erdogan was more critical of
NATO, suggesting that its response had not been robust enough. And yet, he also
made it clear that he did not want to turn his back on either Russia or
Ukraine. His solution: to offer himself as a possible intermediary.
Erdogan tried not to antagonize Putin, abstaining on
the European Council vote suspending Russia, but when faced with criticism, he
co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s attack.
Turkey has already said that it would not follow the
West in applying draconian sanctions against Russia. There are two reasons for
this. The first is political. Years of anti-Western discourse from Erdogan and
his state-controlled media have fostered an inhospitable atmosphere for
Western, and especially American, policies.
Many in Turkey believe that Putin was tricked into
invading Ukraine so that NATO could deliver a decisive blow to Moscow. Hence,
taking a strong stand against Moscow could stir up domestic opposition (even if
the destruction and occupation of Ukraine would intensify outside pressure on
Ankara even further).
The second and more substantial reason is related to
the economic implications of sanctions on a Turkish economy already suffering
from diminished central bank reserves, a fragile currency, and high inflation.
With its dependence on Russia for wheat, fuel, and tourists, Erdogan has no
room to maneuver and no ability to influence future events. This also makes
Turkey an unlikely mediator in the conflict. The Russians have too many ways to
apply pressure to Erdogan in a way that the Ukrainians do not.
The best Erdogan can do is prepare for possible
shortages. Among the few options he has is to accelerate rapprochement with the
Middle East, and especially with hydrocarbon exporters, in the event he must
make up for lost Russian imports.
In the long run, what if the Ukraine crisis becomes
a protracted insurgency supported by NATO countries? Then all bets are off: The
economic issues will be aggravated by potential military ones. The longer this
war goes on, the greater the likelihood Ankara will have no other option but to
strengthen its ties with its NATO partners.
The writer is
the Cohen Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at
the Council of Foreign Relations. ©: Syndication Bureau, www.syndicationbureau.com
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