When Iranian
President Ebrahim Raisi visited Beijing for a three-day state visit last week,
most headlines focused on prospects for reviving the Iran nuclear deal — known
officially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — or how much oil
China might buy from the Islamic Republic.
اضافة اعلان
But a careful review
of what transpired reveals a more sobering, and narrower, picture of China-Iran
relations.
In 2021, China agreed
to invest $400 billion over 25 years to support Iran’s development. The agreement was
reportedly “activated” last year during a
visit to China by Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, leading
many to assume Raisi’s visit would yield specifics on implementation.
Needless to say, they
were disappointed. While there was a long list of matters agreed to — such as
on sovereignty, governance, the JCPOA, and regional affairs — economic
agreements were virtually nonexistent. There was not even reference to the
energy sector or on increasing Chinese imports of Iranian oil and gas — the
impetus for China’s $400 billion pledge. About the only substantial
announcement was related to cooperation on agricultural
technologies.
What is China waiting
for?
Since Raisi became
president in August 2021, Iran has attracted $5.95 billion in direct
foreign investment, and nearly half of that has come from Russia, at $2.7
billion. China’s presence is limited to small- and medium-sized projects
worth just $185 million. The rosy picture
China painted for Iran in 2021 has yet to materialize. What is China waiting
for?
Chinese observers who are critical of Iran’s revolutionary past and expansionist foreign policy believe that by withholding investment, China is looking to restore balance in the Middle East
For starters, China
has been under tremendous international pressure over its economic ties to
Russia since the beginning of the Russian war in Ukraine. Investing heavily in
Iran now would only invite further scrutiny and leave the country open to a new
round of sanctions from Washington. China has made a similar calculation by not
investing heavily in Afghanistan.
Second, Chinese
observers who are critical of Iran’s revolutionary past and expansionist
foreign policy believe that by withholding investment, China is looking to
restore balance in the Middle East. This line of thinking suggests that
Beijing, opposed to Iran’s support of regional militant groups, wants to punish
Tehran for destabilizing the neighborhood.
Third, the JCPOA is a
double-edged sword for China. Without the resumption of the nuclear deal,
China’s economic engagement with Iran faces the threat of financial penalties.
But if the JCPOA is indeed revived, Iran could prioritize more “friendly”
investors from Europe, bypassing China altogether. While China has publicly
called for the resumption of the deal, the shadow of uncertainty it casts on
China’s economic engagement cannot be overlooked.
Other diplomatic priorities
Clearly, China will
not abandon Iran, just as it has not abandoned Russia. As long as the countries
share an agenda — to counter and undermine American dominance — Beijing will
see Tehran as a useful partner in a critical region, and a source of potential
for future collaboration. Raisi’s visit is reflective of this political
conviction, as is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s promise to repay the favor.
Yet rather than
double down on Iran, China is looking to improve ties with the US. In the Middle East,
developing closer relations with GCC states also seems to sit atop Beijing’s list
of priorities.
For pragmatic and
economic reasons, China needs to maintain its relationships with the GCC and
with Iran. This is why Xi’s 2016 visit to the region included stops in both
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and why then-foreign minister Wang Yi’s 2021 visit had
stops in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and
Oman. And, given that Xi was in Saudi Arabia in December, it stands to reason
that Beijing wanted to balance that trip with an invitation to Raisi.
Actions speak louder
than words
But symbolism does not
pay the bills. Based on Chinese investment in the region, it is clear that
Beijing is not favoring Iran over the GCC.
As long as the countries share an agenda — to counter and undermine American dominance — Beijing will see Tehran as a useful partner in a critical region, and a source of potential for future collaboration.
In 2021, China’s
total trade with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Iraq amounted to $230 billion, and trade with
Saudi Arabia alone was $82.4 billion. By comparison,
China’s trade with Iran in 2021 was $14.7 billion, which increased to
$15.8 billion in 2022. Iran is not even among China’s top 10 crude oil suppliers.
The deals China has
signed with GCC states are comprehensive, covering a range of industries from
green energy to digital technologies, transportation, and infrastructure. They
also have implementation schedules, which is fundamentally different from
China’s 25-year agreement with Iran, a pledge that looks great on paper but has
nothing to back it up.
While that does not
mean China will never act, it does mean that China’s lack of action now is not
helping Iran during its most difficult days.
On the second day of
his state visit to China, Raisi visited the elite Peking University, where he
was awarded an “honorary professor” title. The ceremony was
formal and conveyed plenty of warm feelings, but did nothing to advance Raisi’s
objective — to secure investments that might help restore confidence in Iran’s
flagging economy. Just like the rest of his trip, it was all style, no substance.
Yun Sun is director
of the China program and co-director of the East Asia
program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC. Copyright: Syndication
Bureau.
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