Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are threatening to destabilize the South Caucasus, prompting some to worry that Iran could eventually be pulled into a wider regional conflict. But is Iran really prepared to invade its Shia-majority neighbor to protect Armenia, or are recent military moves little more than bluster?اضافة اعلان
While Azerbaijan’s military continues to capture parts of Nagorno-Karabakh — internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan despite being under Armenian control for three decades — leaders in the energy-rich country accuse the Islamic Republic of amassing troops near its exclave of Nakhchivan, on Iran’s northwestern border.
Tehran has not denied the allegations. On the contrary, the Al-Quds Force — one of five branches of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has reported that its bases near the Armenia-Azerbaijan border are on high alert for a possible attack. Heavy logistical movements of the Azerbaijani army raised concerns in Iran that an operation against Armenia was imminent, and IRGC commander Brigadier-General Mohammad Pakpour visited the area on March 24.
There are even reports that IRGC forces in Iran’s provinces of East and West Azerbaijan — where ethnic Azeris make up most of the population — have been ordered to full combat readiness.
But despite the recent spike in tensions, the current situation in the South Caucasus remains manageable, and Iran’s calculations are more strategic than tactical. At least for now.
Iran seems determined to prevent a potential Azerbaijani attack on southern Armenia, though it remains unclear how far it might go to avert such a scenario.
Azerbaijan uses the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a way to pressure Armenia to build its section of the Nakhchivan corridor, a land route that would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan via southern Armenia’s province of Syunik. If built under Baku’s terms, the corridor would effectively cut off Iran from Armenia, something that Alireza Monadi, a representative of the Iranian city of Tabriz, said Tehran “will not allow.” (Indeed, Mohammad-Reza Mirtajodini, Iran’s former vice president for parliamentary affairs, has even called for Tehran to annex Nakhchivan in response).
The IRGC was even more direct. On its official Telegram channels, the revolutionary guard posted open threats to Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev over his “hostile actions against Armenia.” Iran seems determined to prevent a potential Azerbaijani attack on southern Armenia, though it remains unclear how far it might go to avert such a scenario.
The reason for Iran’s concern is simple: Azerbaijan’s control over southern Armenia would jeopardize Tehran’s positions in the South Caucasus, and pose an existential threat to the Islamic Republic itself.
In the north, Iran would be completely surrounded by Turkic countries, and Tehran fears that Azerbaijan could eventually allow Israel to use its territory for attacks on the Islamic Republic. Already, Azerbaijan is strengthening its military and intelligence relations with Israel — Iran’s archenemy.
If Tehran turns a blind eye to Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation, such a move could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. That is why Tehran is expected to continue flexing its military muscles in the region — aiming to demonstrate that the territorial integrity of Armenia is Iran’s red line.
Time may be on Iran’s side, as the only major incident recently was in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Azerbaijani forces took “urgent measures” to prevent the construction of a road to bypass the Lachin corridor – the only road connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.
If Tehran turns a blind eye to Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation, such a move could be interpreted as a sign of weakness. That is why Tehran is expected to continue flexing its military muscles in the region — aiming to demonstrate that the territorial integrity of Armenia is Iran’s red line.
For now, diplomacy appears to be the desired course of action. On March 11, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador in Baku to protest against the presence of an Iranian warplane over the disputed area.
Earlier this year, Azerbaijan closed its embassy in Tehran and evacuated staff and their families after a gunman stormed the diplomatic mission, killing the security chief and wounding two guards. Thus, diplomatic relations between the two neighbors remain tense, and both sides occasionally add fuel to the fire.
The question now is whether diplomacy will be enough to pull all sides back from the brink. Azerbaijan has considered engaging ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran as instruments against the Islamic Republic. In November 2022, President Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan would “do everything to protect the rights, freedoms, and security of Azerbaijanis living abroad, including Azerbaijanis in Iran.” His statement was a direct message to the Islamic Republic, designed to show that Baku has significant leverage in, and over Tehran.
Iran, for its part, could use the Shia factor as its trump card against Azerbaijan. But this could backfire, given that Baku frequently arrests members of Shia groups that are allegedly planning to carry out acts of sabotage and disruption under the guise of religion.
If, however, Iran decides to raise the stakes and attack Israeli-backed Azerbaijan under any pretext, it risks an open confrontation with a country that will be strongly supported not only by Israel, but also by NATO member Turkey.
Thus, policymakers in Tehran will have to think twice before taking any action in the South Caucasus. Direct confrontation can be avoided, but only if cooler heads prevail.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention on energy and pipeline politics.
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