As the war in Ukraine exposes Russia’s political and
military weaknesses, countries once firmly in the Kremlin’s orbit are engaged
in a frantic reshuffling of geopolitical alliances. The burgeoning relationship
between Kazakhstan and Turkey is among the most active examples.
اضافة اعلان
Kazakhstan, long a Russian ally in the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and a member of the Moscow-led Eurasian
Union, is being wooed by Turkish investment and military hardware. Although
Kazakhstan’s economy is and will likely remain heavily linked to Russia, at
least in the short term, Ankara is gradually developing close ties with
Nur-Sultan in a bid to strengthen its own position in the region.
Not long ago, Russia’s hold on Kazakhstan looked
secure. Following mass violent protests that paralyzed Kazakhstan in early
January, Russia and other CSTO countries deployed some 2,000 troops to the
former Soviet republic, allegedly to stabilize the situation in the energy-rich
nation. As a result, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev consolidated his
power while Russia played the role of savior.
But Russia’s gains were temporary, and the invasion
of Ukraine has strained relations between leaders in Moscow and Nur-Sultan.
Kazakhstan has not endorsed the Kremlin’s military activities and has even
begun sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine. President Tokayev also decided not
to hold a traditional Victory Day parade in the capital on May 9, sending a
symbolic message to the Kremlin that Kazakhstan is looking to leave Russia’s
sphere to influence.
More importantly, Kazakhstan has refused to
recognize the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s
Republic, as well as the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea. And because Moscow has
not pushed Nur-Sultan for support, Kazakhstan has continued to pursue its own
“multi-vector” foreign policy, originally established by the country’s former
president Nursultan Nazarbayev.
Closer military ties with Turkey is one element of
this multi-vector approach. Two days after Russia invaded Ukraine in February,
Olzhas Kusainov, head of the Kazakhstan Defense Ministry’s International
Cooperation Department, met with Fatih Pala, the Turkish military attaché in
Nur-Sultan. Then in early May, President Tokayev visited his Turkish
counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Ankara, where the two nations agreed to
co-produce Turkey’s Anka drone, and to hold joint drills near Turkey’s coastal
city of Izmir this spring.
Kazakhstan is also planning significant increases to
its military budget, and some experts point to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as
the impetus. For instance, there are fears that Moscow may have territorial claims to northern Kazakhstan,
where ethnic Russians make up the majority of the population.
While any attempt to annex parts of Kazakhstan seem
unrealistic at the moment, given Russia’s poor showing in Ukraine, Kazakhstan
will continue strengthening military ties with regional allies like Turkey as a
hedge against further Russian expansionism.
Kazakhstan is a petroleum powerhouse, with some 3 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. It is also one of the world’s largest producers of uranium, and among the top 10 producers of coal, iron, and gold.
Besides defense, Turkey and Kazakhstan are
strengthening economic cooperation. Presidents Erdogan and Tokayev signed more
than a dozen agreements during their meeting this month, deals in areas such as
information technology, culture, agriculture, and education. Ankara and
Nur-Sultan are even said to be developing transport ties to bypass Russia via
the Trans-Caspian international transport route, which travels through China,
Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and onward to Europe.
Meanwhile, total trade volume between Turkey and
Kazakhstan now exceeds $5.3 billion annually, and Erdogan has pledged to push
that to $10 billion. While this is still less than half of the $25.5 billion in
trade that Kazakhstan does with Russia, the potential for trade with Turkey
feels exponential.
Many believe that Turkey’s interests in Kazakhstan,
and in Central Asia in general, are part of Erdogan’s ambitions to establish a
neo-Ottoman Empire, a so-called Turkic World. But even if there is an element
of truth in that assumption, it is also true that Turkey’s goals are driven by
economic interests that are heavily linked with energy.
Kazakhstan is a petroleum powerhouse, with some 3
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. It is also one of the world’s
largest producers of uranium, and among the top 10 producers of coal, iron, and
gold. Thus, in order to reduce its energy dependence on Moscow, Ankara may have
little choice but to increase its influence in Kazakhstan.
Although Russia still has significant leverage in
Kazakhstan – due to territorial proximity, cultural ties, and Kazakhstan’s
economic integration in the Eurasian Union – Turkey can offer something that
Russia cannot: A clean slate.
Russia’s military debacle in Ukraine could
significantly impact the Kremlin’s position in Central Asia, and in Kazakhstan
in particular. If Russia were to suffer a humiliating defeat, Nur-Sultan would
seek security assurances elsewhere. And Turkey, eager to make its own mark on
regional politics, is already preparing the ground for such an outcome.
The writer is a political analyst in Serbia. His work
focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with
special attention on energy and “pipeline politics”.
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