One of the greatest yet most underappreciated
feats of Jordanian diplomacy in recent years was the tripartite agreement of
July 2017 signed between Jordan, Russia, and the US to implement a ceasefire
across southern Syria and create a de-escalation zone.
اضافة اعلان
This feat of diplomacy helped
maintain relative law and order in southern Syria and prevented the spread of lawlessness
and violence that had characterized other parts of the country. The Jordanian
calculus at the time was likely that this would also prevent a further mass
exodus of refugees or a spillover of violence into Jordan, scenarios posing serious
threats to Jordan’s national security.
Of equal importance, Jordan also needed
to address the growing Iranian presence at the joint border, and the growing terrorist
threat in southern Syria that included Daesh, Al-Qaeda, and their various
affiliates, as well as terrorist groups masquerading as armed opposition
groups. There were several factors that seemingly contributed to the pursuit
and formulation of this policy option for Jordan, and primary among them was the
lack of viable alternatives.
In terms of capacity, Russia was indeed able to use its leverage and presence on the ground to prevent community-led violence through its policing and monitoring missions.
Though there are fundamental
differences in comparing Jordan and Turkey’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis
Syria, the comparison is worth raising. The chosen Turkish policy, which
utilizes regular ground offensives and incursions into Syrian territory, was
never a viable option for Jordan — either politically or militarily.
A welcome role for RussiaA key assumption about the
agreement was that Russia would be willing and able to enforce it.
In terms of capacity, Russia was indeed able to use its leverage and presence
on the ground to prevent community-led violence through its policing and
monitoring missions.
Russia enjoyed this leverage not
only because of its ability to project force if needed, but also because it was
seen as an acceptable broker by the main stakeholders; Jordan enjoyed close
relations with Russia and Syria maintained even closer relations.
For its part, the Trump
Administration had also begun to open up to Russia at the time and simultaneously
appeared interested in disengaging from the region. So while Russia may not
have been an ideal broker for the US, the Russian role was largely welcomed by it.
In terms of willingness, Russia
seemed to have a vested interest in the agreement because it wanted to reconstitute
the Syrian state and reach some form of political settlement or national
reconciliation there that would be palatable to the international community and
also eventually end its part in managing the country’s security.
The other player: IranIn retrospect, one of the areas where
Russian willingness or ability comes into question insofar as implementing the
agreement was in regards to convincing Iran to abide by it. While Russia seemed
to want to reconstitute the Russian state, the opposite could be argued when it
came to Iran. The disarray in Syria and Syrian institutions only justified its
continued presence and involvement in the country as well as its affairs — an
interest that would allow it to threaten regional countries with greater ease.
While this put Moscow and Tehran at
odds, it did not significantly impact the former’s willingness or ability to curtail
the latter’s presence.
The revenues generated by the Syrian regime from drug trafficking and the leverage it gives Syria against regional countries pose significant challenges for Russia’s ability to intervene.
More recently, the conflict in
Ukraine may have rendered this possibility even more unlikely because it is
believed to have diverted Russian resources and attention elsewhere. Likewise,
current international pressures on Russia and Iran may have even drawn them closer
together than ever before; they are the most and second-most sanctioned
countries in the world respectively and depend on each other for a host of
economic and other needs.
Heightened stakesIt is important to recognize the benefits
afforded to Jordan by the conclusion of the agreement while it lasted. At the
same time, there is now a pressing need to consider similar innovative
approaches to stabilizing southern Syria. The scale and scope of drug
production and trafficking being conducted by the Syrian regime and its weaponization
against Jordan and the region at large necessitate this.
Whether Russia can play any role
in its development and implementation is unknown. The stakes are certainly much
higher this time around — the revenues generated by the Syrian regime from drug
trafficking and the leverage it gives Syria against regional countries pose
significant challenges for Russia’s ability to intervene, assuming that the
willingness is there to begin with.
One thing is clear: the current
situation in southern Syria is not tenable. The vacuum created there by the
Syrian regime’s neglect will sooner or later boil over and lead to new security
dynamics.
Nasser bin Nasser is founder and CEO of Ambit Advisory.
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