A recent move by the Syrian regime to seize the assets of 35 accused smugglers has raised
questions about President Bashar Al-Assad’s intentions and regional strategy.
Beyond the unusually high number of people targeted simultaneously, the
profiles and affiliations of those under scrutiny are turning heads in Damascus
and beyond.
اضافة اعلان
The seizure made headlines when a leaked list of suspects surfaced earlier this month.
In addition to Mudallal Omar Al-Aziz, a member of parliament, the dragnet
included several militia commanders with extensive connections to the regime
and its ally, Iran.
Among them is Firas Al-Jaham, also known as Firas Al-Iraqi,
commander of the National Defense militia, and Hassan Al-Ghadban, a notable
leader in the Fourth Armored Division, which is led by Maher Al Assad, the
brother of the Syrian president.
On the surface, the seizures appear to be a resolute stance
against illicit financial activities.
The leaked document states that the individuals were
targeted because of their involvement in smuggling goods worth a staggering
16.6 billion Syrian pounds (about $2 million). The potential fines could top
100 billion Syrian pounds, underscoring the severity.
But scratch the surface and an ulterior motive for the
seizures emerges. In addition to securing regional political gains, Assad’s
move seems to be part of a larger strategy aimed at extracting money from
cronies who have neglected their financial obligations.
Many of Syria’s business elites, particularly those who continued to operate during the conflict, have accumulated their wealth, directly or indirectly, through their connections to the regime.
The timing of the asset seizures strongly suggests a regime desire to bolster
its political position in the region, specifically with Iraq. All 35 of those
targeted are from Deir Ezzor, a governorate located on the Syria-Iraq border
that is known as a prominent hub for trafficking activities, particularly in
narcotics. Coming shortly before a visit to Iraq by Syrian Foreign
Minister Faisal Mekdad, the moves were part of the regime’s proactive measures
to address border security and drug trafficking.
Taking a strong stance on these issues is important for Al
Assad’s relationship with Iraq, but also in meeting the regional requirements
to reintegrate Syria into the Arab community.
After a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Amman in May,
Syria agreed to collaborate with Iraq in combating the drug
trade.
But achieving geopolitical gains is not Assad’s only
motivation. Since 2019, the regime has been extorting loyalist businessmen and war profiteers to
pay its bills. While Assad’s main supporters, Iran and Russia, were
instrumental in helping the regime prevail in the war, neither country has
stepped in with enough financial support to help Syria emerge from its current economic crisis. As a result, the regime has
resorted to unconventional short-term tactics to keep its economy afloat.
Many of Syria’s business elites, particularly those who
continued to operate during the conflict, have accumulated their wealth,
directly or indirectly, through their connections to the regime. With the war
essentially won, Assad feels emboldened to call on them to help fund Syria’s
recovery. Those who comply can continue their business activities as normal.
Those who refuse or fail to comply, however, face
repercussions. They are either subjected to verbal threats or face punitive measures such as asset
freezes on charges of tax evasion or corruption.
Prominent figures who have experienced shakedowns
include Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s cousin, and Mohammad Hamsho and
Wassim Al-Qattan. But these extortion tactics have extended beyond high-profile
individuals to include business owners and war profiteers at all levels.
Achieving geopolitical gains is not Assad’s only motivation. Since 2019, the regime has been extorting loyalist businessmen and war profiteers to pay its bills.
In cases of alleged criminal activity, the regime’s
disinterest in enforcing the rule of law is evidenced by its approach: Instead
of facing the threat of imprisonment, those accused are merely required to pay
fines. After targeted individuals fall in line they typically return to
operating as usual. The most recent case is no exception. Most of the 35 people
named in the leaked document have smuggled goods, oil, and drugs between Syria
and Iraq for years, and will likely continue doing so now.
The regime dose not even seem worried about cutting off
defendants’ access to wealth. Despite the widespread practice of using family
members’ names to shield assets, none of those accused have been targeted in
this way, suggesting that the seizures were more of a message than a genuine
effort to end their illicit activities.
The evolving dynamics in Syria and its reemergence from the
cold will test regional allies in new and complex ways. Policymakers engaging
with Al Assad must guard against seemingly innocuous policies and probe beneath
the surface to understand the true motives behind his regime’s actions.
Dr Haid Haid is a Syrian columnist and a consulting
associate fellow of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa program.
Twitter: @HaidHaid22
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