Over the past decade, Middle Eastern countries have signed
at least 16 minilateral agreements, but many of these have produced scant
results due to political instability, security challenges and the relatively
low fiscal and administrative capacity of some regional governments. Superpower
competition and ineffective multilateral institutions have played a major role
in states turning to minilateral diplomacy to solve pressing security, economic
and development challenges.
اضافة اعلان
The 2020 Abraham Accords between Bahrain, Israel and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) (later expanded to include Morocco and Sudan) and the 2022 Negev Forum
were noteworthy peace-building initiatives centred on Israel’s regional
integration. Yet the former has been hampered by hostile public opinion in Arab
participant countries, a problem that has surely worsened since Hamas’s attack
on Israel in October 2023. Both issues have stunted the development of strong
people-to-people relations, as
envisioned by
the agreement. The Hamas–Israel war has shattered any assumption that
Israel can achieve regional political and economic integration while ignoring
the Palestinian issue.
Economic security and resilience are also significant motivators for
minilateral diplomacy in the region. Twelve out of sixteen agreements signed in
the Middle East during the past ten years pertained to economic issues. The
failure of the New Levant Initiative, created by Egypt, Jordan and Iraq in
March 2019 to foster economic integration, highlights some of the main
obstacles to economically oriented minilateral coalitions. The initiative was
originally intended
to create joint industrial zones, investments in connectivity
infrastructure and increase trade. Although the countries have made tangible
progress connecting their electrical grids, most other projects are facing
political and financial difficulties. For example, the Basra–Aqaba oil pipeline
– which aims to transfer one million barrels per day for Jordanian consumption
and export to international markets –
has been delayed by disagreements among Iraqi
politicians, an unstable security situation in Iraq and Iranian interference in
Iraqi politics. Fiscal constraints, inefficient government bureaucracies and
militancy plaguing Iraq and Egypt, have also hamstrung progress in implementing
projects under the initiative.
Minilateral agreements have even floundered in cases where security, fiscal
capacity and government efficiency are not major barriers to trade and
investment. India, Israel, the UAE and the United States
created I2U2 in
2021 ‘to promote high-quality sustainable investment among partner countries’.
The group has made ambitious announcements, including the launch of a new
joint venture in the space industry and the creation
of the
India–Middle East Food Corridor involving
US$2 billion in Emirati investments into food parks in
India. Yet the announcements have not produced tangible outcomes. The delay in
UAE investments in India’s agricultural sector, for instance, is explained
partly by the UAE’s concerns over India’s growing food protectionism. India’s
Essential Commodities Act allows Indian authorities greater leeway in placing
export bans on agricultural items,
putting the feasibility of investments in food parks
at greater risk.
While minilateral diplomacy has generated many creative policy ideas and
positive headlines, it has proven difficult to deliver on agreements for the
same reasons multilateral efforts have been ineffective: the limited fiscal
capacity of participant states, the inefficiency of regional governments, a
lack of regional policy harmonization, and the persistence of internal and
cross-border security threats.
Laith Alajlouni is a Research Associate in the IISS-Middle East office, Manama.
He is a political economist working on the issues of geoeconomics and strategy
in the Middle East.
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