On June 10, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), Rafael Mariano Grossi, warned that Iran’s latest moves on its nuclear
program could strike the “fatal blow” to efforts to restore the 2015 nuclear
agreement. That agreement, signed by Iran and the permanent five members of the
UN Security Council plus Germany, was upended when the then president Donald
Trump pulled the US out in 2018. Despite his campaign pledges in 2020, President
Joe Biden has not found a way to return the US to formal participation, and
Iranian actions in recent months make it increasingly unlikely that the deal
can be restored to its original purpose: restraining Iran’s nuclear activities
and provide sanctions relief.
اضافة اعلان
For months, talks to revive the agreement to limit
Iran’s nuclear developments, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), have lurched between minor diplomatic progress and sustained impasses.
But the mood has darkened with Iran’s decision to turn off 27 cameras installed
to monitor enrichment activity, under the terms of the 2015 agreement. This has
led to diminished confidence, at the IAEA in Vienna, that the international
community can bring this process to a successful close.
This discouraging prospect will prompt a range of
responses, from those who always found the agreement just a delaying tactic to
an inevitable confrontation with Iran, to those who will anguish about what
could have been done differently to keep the JCPOA alive. There are three areas
that can help us understand how we reached this point: US policy, Iran’s
calculations, and the changing geopolitical environment.
Many in the US are already questioning why the Biden
administration did not have a better strategy to get the US back to the JCPOA.
Unlike the Paris climate accord, where the president simply declared that
Trump’s policy was voided, the Biden team seemed to feel compelled to push for
a better deal than the original agreement, and to agonize over how sanctions
relief would occur. Pressure from both Republicans and Democrats, who were long
skeptical of the agreement, led to a prolonged policy formulation, with new
coordination with European allies on nuclear and non-nuclear concerns that
could be seen as complicating the basic diplomatic task related to the JCPOA.
Speculation that the desire to reduce US commitments
in the Middle East and, later, the Russian invasion of Ukraine also moved the
Iran problem off the front burner do not ring true, but seem to be part of the
narrative outside the US.
In recent testimony, the administration’s lead on
the Iran agreement, Rob Malley, also acknowledged, with good reason, that the
Trump policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran was so counterproductive that the
Biden team had a very steep hill to climb, and the simple hope to flip the
switch back to full US participation was not an option.
In explaining the Abraham Accords, Iranian pundits see a unifying fear of America’s withdrawal from the region. That is Iran’s grand strategy, so if these agreements lead to less American influence because regional states are assuming more responsibility, Iran still wins.
It is even harder to determine the Iranian side of
the story. Do Iran’s leaders want to kill the agreement, or do they think their
defiance will simply win them more concessions in negotiations?
Given the power concentrated with Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his deep mistrust of international institutions,
Iran may have hoped for concessions on sanctions but would be willing to live
with the demise of the JCPOA. Whether that means a race to the finish line of a
fully deployable nuclear weapon or something shy of that remains to be seen.
Does Iran view the regional environment as favoring
its interests? And would such a judgment be a key factor in its behavior on the
nuclear file?
One key change in the region is the consolidation of
the Arab-Israel relationship, albeit without the Palestinians. The
normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and
Sudan is certainly a net loss for Iran, given that the Iranian threat more than
any other factor drove the countries to rethink their relationships.
Iran has condemned what it calls the “Arab Zionist
NATO” and its security establishment would be wise to take seriously the new
security cooperation among its adversaries. But wily Iranians also find a
silver lining: In explaining the Abraham Accords, Iranian pundits see a
unifying fear of America’s withdrawal from the region. That is Iran’s grand
strategy, so if these agreements lead to less American influence because
regional states are assuming more responsibility, Iran still wins.
In the cases of Iran’s clients in Beirut, Baghdad,
Damascus, and Sanaa, it is a very messy and mixed picture. Lebanon’s collapse
as a viable state and the decline of Hezbollah’s voting power are not good for
Iran, but Tehran probably finds use of Lebanese territory as a platform for
drones and missiles as sufficient for its interests. Likewise, Syria’s survival
is good enough for Iran, but its relations with Arabs and Kurds are never
easy.
Iraq, even before completing government formation,
has taken the strange step of legislating any contact with Israel as
treasonous, presumably mostly a symbolic effort for power broker Muqtada Al-
Sadr to not be outflanked by more pro-Iranian Shiite factions. It is a
peculiarly counterproductive move, in terms of Iraq’s larger desire to be
integrated in the region, to be less reliant on Iran, and to sustain productive
security cooperation with western countries.
So the new
geopolitics of the region may persuade Tehran that it can live without the
JCPOA, working with Russia and China to block any new punitive measures, and
taking small victories in its client states. For the rest of the region, and
for western powers, a world without the JCPOA is a more dangerous one. Improved cooperation among those states that
fear Iran may be a positive development, but not sufficient to achieve regional
security.
The
writer is director of the international security program at the Schar School of
Policy and Government at George Mason University in Virginia. She is a former
vice chair of the US National Intelligence Council.
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