While the war in Ukraine rages on, Turkey is attempting to portray itself as
a bridge between Russia and the West. Such a foreign policy may help Ankara
achieve some of its geopolitical goals not just in the Black Sea region, but
also in the Middle East, as well as in the South Caucasus.
اضافة اعلان
Last week,
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan traveled to the Russian resort of Sochi to meet
Vladimir Putin. Only 17 days earlier, the two leaders had met in Tehran where
Erdogan reportedly sought to get the green light from Russia and Iran to launch
a “special military operation” in northern Syria. In Sochi, the war-ravaged
nation was on the agenda again.
Putin and Erdogan “stressed the key importance of
sincere, candid and trustful relations between Russia and Turkey in achieving
regional and international stability”, the two presidents said in a joint
statement after a four-hour meeting.
“The importance of preserving the political unity
and territorial integrity of Syria was also stressed.”
Does that mean Turkey will not invade Syria once
again, and will give up its ambitions to create a 30-kilometer deep buffer zone
in northern Syria along the Turkish border?
Prior to the meeting, the Kremlin called on Ankara
“not to destabilize” Syria, pointing out that it is very important “not to
allow any action that could jeopardize the territorial and political integrity
of Syria”.
Turkey sees Kurdish militants in northern Syria as a
major security threat while Russia backs Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.
But what if Ankara decides to raise the stakes, and
attempts to force Moscow to make concessions to Turkey regarding Syria?
For instance, instead of destabilizing Syria, Turkey
could indirectly destabilize Moscow’s nominal ally Armenia in the Caucasus
region. Recently, Azerbaijan’s restive Nagorno-Karabakh area, where Russia has
almost 2,000 peacekeeping troops, was on the brink of escalation. The Azeri
Defense Ministry accused Armenian-backed Nagorno-Karabakh troops of targeting
its army positions in the district of Lachin, which is under the supervision of
a Russian peacekeeping force. After that, Azerbaijan, which is rich in oil and
gas, reportedly took control over several strategic positions in the
mountainous region.
Given that Moscow remains preoccupied with Ukraine,
it is unlikely that it can help Armenia in case it leads to an escalation in
the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, is firmly backed by Turkey.
The two countries established allied relations in 2021, which means that Ankara
could use the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to put pressure on the
Kremlin to turn a blind eye to potential Turkish actions in northern Syria.
From Turkey’s perspective, such a move would
perfectly illustrate how weak the Kremlin’s positions in Syria and the South
Caucasus have become. At the same time, it would clearly show that Moscow would
have a very hard time preserving its influence in both regions. Indeed, as a
result of Russia’s isolation in the global arena, Erdogan seems to have the
upper hand over Putin, which means that the Russian leader might eventually
have to make certain concessions to his frenemy.
Erdogan, on the other hand, could use Putin as a
source of leverage with the US. The Turkish president has reportedly said that
Putin proposed establishing in Russia a joint factory that would produce
military drones. However, Haluk Bayraktar, the CEO of Turkey’s Baykar company
which produces sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles, ruled out supplying
Bayraktar drones to Russia. Ukraine is currently using Bayraktar drones against
Russian troops.
Indeed, as a result of Russia’s isolation in the global arena, Erdogan seems to have the upper hand over Putin, which means that the Russian leader might eventually have to make certain concessions to his frenemy.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied that Putin
and Erdogan discussed the drone issue during the Sochi summit, even though he
previously had said that the two leaders would discuss military-technical
cooperation.
Whether or not they talked about Bayraktar drones,
which have proved effective in a series of other recent conflicts, Erdogan was
probably sending a message to Washington: If you continue opposing our plans to
fight the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units in northern Syria, we may
sell drones to Russia, or build a joint drone manufacturing company with
Moscow. Such an action, however, would have massive implications for Turkey’s
NATO membership, especially given that Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400
anti-missile systems in 2019 had a serious impact on its relations with
Washington. That is why Erdogan is unlikely to risk any additional
confrontation with the US, and will continue trying to balance Turkey’s
alliance with Washington and its economic cooperation with Russia.
Unlike other NATO allies, Ankara has not joined
anti-Western sanctions, nor does it intend to stop purchasing Russian energy.
Moreover, according to Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, Putin
and Erdogan have agreed that Ankara will start making payments for Moscow’s
natural gas in roubles.
In addition, despite sanctions, Bloomberg reported
that Russia’s state-run nuclear power giant Rosatom recently transferred
“around $5 billion” to a subsidiary in Turkey building the $20 billion nuclear
power plant in the country’s Mersin province. The Akkuyu Nuclear plant is
expected to produce up to 10 percent of Turkey’s electricity once all four
reactors are in operation in 2023.
Even though Ankara remains one of Washington’s most
important allies in the Middle East, it will almost certainly preserve a
significant autonomy in its foreign policy, and will continue developing
pragmatic ties with Russia. Such a Turkish position will allow Moscow to remain
an unavoidable regional actor, at least for now. In the long-term, the Kremlin,
due to its isolation and a military debacle in Ukraine, could eventually become
Turkey’s junior partner in a geopolitical tango that Moscow and Ankara dance
from the Middle East, through the Caucasus and the Black Sea region, all the
way to Central Asia.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work
focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with
special attention on energy and ‘pipeline politics’. Syndication Bureau.
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