From
the start of the Ukraine invasion, Vladimir Putin has understood that Russia
retains one immeasurable advantage: time. The sheer size of the Russian
landmass, population, and economy, as well as Putin’s iron grip over the
country's politics, means that the war could churn on for weeks, months, or
even years without causing government-altering pain in Moscow. Indeed, part of
the West's strategy in arming Ukraine so rapidly after the invasion was to
force the pace against Moscow, to try to inflict a series of defeats on Russia
that would force it to the negotiating table.
اضافة اعلان
So
it has been proven. Twenty months into the invasion another war came along,
taking the political focus of the West and the wider world away from Ukraine.
The Gaza war – what historians will likely call the Second October War, coming
50 years after the 1973 October War – has become an opportunity for Russia, a
chance to regain the moral high ground, stand among the Global South, and
change the country's relationships with Middle Eastern nations.
The
first has been much discussed. The carte blanche offered to Israel by the
United States and other countries has been
a gift from the West to Moscow.
The
Kremlin and its political and media supporters have repeatedly drawn an
unflattering parallel between the way the US responded to the Ukraine invasion
– with threats and sanctions against Russia – and the way it has responded to
Israel's attacks on Gaza. The hypocrisy is glaring and perfectly fits Russia's
narrative that great powers behave differently, and rules don't apply to them.
Why, therefore, they ask, must rules apply to a great power like Russia, when
it perceives a danger from Ukraine?
Related
to this attempt to regain the moral high ground has been the ability to
grandstand among the countries of the Global South.
Analysts
have noted that the
United Nations resolution introduced by Russia 10 days after the Gaza war started to
bring about a ceasefire was a diplomatic failure – and it was, but only in
part. Yes, the resolution failed to pass, but with China and Russia in favor
and the expected Western allies of the US, the UK, and France against, a
message was conveyed to the court of public opinion in the Global South that
the global body was biased against their interests.
Those
changes are more about public image than real politics, although they do have
an effect. But the Gaza war is also altering Russia's relationship with other
countries in the Middle East.
For
years, Russia has tried to maintain pragmatic relations with Israel. With its
strong footing in Syria, it has tried to play the role of a mediating power,
allowing Israel some leeway to bomb sites inside the country, while also giving
Iran room to act.
The
Gaza war has shifted that. Within two weeks of the October 7 attack that
started the war, Russia welcomed a
Hamas delegation to Moscow, ostensibly to discuss how to safeguard Russian citizens. But since that
could have been done without such an official visit – and as it was noted that
Iran's deputy foreign minister was there at the same time – the not
unreasonable interpretation was that Russia was facilitating planning between
the two. Since then, the relationship has soured further, and the UN envoys of
both countries have
traded harsh words.
For
Russia, shifting away from Israel carries the possibility of gaining political
support from across the Muslim world. It makes it harder for Arab states, and
Turkey, to support Ukraine openly. After
Volodymyr Zelensky’sopen support for Israel and lack of statements on the destruction in Gaza, he
will not be welcome at next year’s Arab League summit. That may have been a
miscalculation on Zelensky’s part, but Moscow will capitalize on it.
The
war also means that Russian-Turkey relations are getting warmer.
Long
before the Ukraine invasion, the two have warily circled each other in Syria,
and the Ukraine conflict has seen Turkey try to balance relations with both
sides. But the Gaza war has changed that and placed them both on the same side.
Both have aimed their barbs either at Israel or its principal backer the United
States; both see in that a chance for a greater role. For Turkey, that would be
something like the moral leadership of the Middle East; for Russia, a rival to
China for leadership of the Global South.
The
Gaza war has offered an opportunity for Russia to move beyond the war in
Ukraine in its relations with the Middle East.
The
return of Russia to the Middle East is often overstated. Russia, for all its
search for ways to project influence across the Global South, appears
uninterested in the extensive backing for Arab and African governments seen
during the Cold War.
Instead,
Russia today practices a form of “vacuum diplomacy,” rushing to fill the spaces
left by a retreating America, pushing out Western influence once it becomes
unpopular, or supporting sidelined political groups. Those elements can be seen
in its recent welcome of Hamas to Moscow; in the way Wagner operatives
collaborate with African governments, or in the way Moscow was happy to save
the Syrian regime from its armed opponents.
The
same is true for this Gaza conflict, which has come at an opportune time for
Putin. With Western backing for Israel seemingly without conditions or limits,
a space has opened for Russia to once again dive into the politics of the
Middle East. It was only a matter of time.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing
a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV
news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC
and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. X: @FaisalAlYafai
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