Tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over a highly controversial dam on
the Blue Nile are expected to rise over the next few months as the rainy season
marks the next phase in filling the reservoir. The dispute already represents
one of the world’s most serious diplomatic conundrums at a time when climate
change is making water scarcity a more critical issue. Adding to the
complexity, the conflict is likely to become emblematic of ongoing shifts away
from a US-dominated unipolar world order. The transition is expected to witness
the emergence of China in regions vacated or neglected by the US and the
emergence of regional multilateral groupings that will manage collective
regional security.
اضافة اعلان
In February this year, Ethiopia began generating
electricity from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), despite protests
downstream from Egypt and Sudan. The dam is a flagship project for Ethiopia’s
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who needs the project to come to fruition now more
than ever. Reeling from a damaging civil war in Tigray and a faltering economy,
the dam will allow Abiy to whip up nationalist sentiment.
Meanwhile, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El Sisi
faces political turbulence in the months ahead due to Egypt’s economy being
particularly exposed to the global repercussions of the Ukraine war. Having
framed the dam as an existential threat to Egypt, its completion by Ethiopia
carries high political costs for Sisi. Yet neither he nor Abiy can afford to go
to war over the issue.
Ethiopia has faced strident criticism and sanctions
from the US over the Tigray conflict, and Addis Ababa believes Washington has
favored the Egyptian position on the dam. As a result, the US is no longer
considered a neutral arbiter, at least by Ethiopia. Furthermore, US President
Joe Biden’s administration is far too distracted by Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and China to pay attention to rising tensions between Egypt and
Ethiopia. It would be happy to outsource the problem to its allies in the Gulf,
which maintain good relations with Khartoum, Cairo, and Addis Ababa.
Thus far, Biden’s administration has taken a position on the dam that is sympathetic to Cairo. It is unlikely to adopt a more neutral position because the US is keen for Egypt to export gas to Europe in light of American and EU efforts to cut Russian gas imports. The drawdown of American influence on the Nile dam dispute paves the way for a more significant Chinese involvement in the issue and the broader region.
Yet the lack of active involvement by the US is
another sign of its waning global influence and a harbinger of the eventual transition
away from a world dominated by one superpower. Earlier this month, the Biden
administration’s special envoy for the Horn of Africa announced his resignation
a mere three months after assuming his position. His predecessor too resigned
after less than a year on the job. This is a further sign of drift in US
foreign policy, particularly towards the region.
Thus far, Biden’s
administration has taken a position on the dam that is sympathetic to Cairo. It
is unlikely to adopt a more neutral position because the US is keen for Egypt
to export gas to Europe in light of American and EU efforts to cut Russian gas
imports. The drawdown of American influence on the Nile dam dispute paves the
way for a more significant Chinese involvement in the issue and the broader
region.
China has funded
the dam and has considerable commercial investments in Ethiopia and
security-related assets in the Horn of Africa. It also backs the regime of
Abdel Fattah Al Burhan in Sudan. It is a crucial investor in Egypt’s New Administrative
Capital project, in which El Sisi has invested considerable political capital.
Beijing, along with Moscow, has repeatedly used its veto power at the UN
Security Council to prevent harsh condemnation of Ethiopia’s conduct in the
Tigray war. China is likely to step up efforts to bring Cairo, Khartoum, and
Addis Ababa to the negotiating table. As a result, it is expected to emerge as
a critical power in the Horn of Africa region and increase its influence in
Egypt and the GCC. Indeed, just as the Biden administration flounders on its
foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa, China’s recently appointed special
envoy to the region toured several countries there in March and announced that
Beijing would host a peace conference dedicated to the region this year.
Rising tensions over the dam in the context of a
waning American presence will allow regional states to seek closer integration
on security matters. Without an immediate solution to the dam issue, Egypt is
likely to pursue tighter integration with Sudan to present a united front
against Ethiopia. This also works to benefit Al Burhan’s regime in Khartoum,
particularly since the coup last year that overthrew the civilian-led
transitional government.
Last week, Burhan visited Cairo and both countries
agreed to coordinate on Ethiopia’s dam. Burhan’s government could benefit from
the technical expertise and collaboration promised by Cairo during his visit.
By extension, GCC states and Israel are likely to extend support to Sudan and
use Khartoum’s relations with Addis Ababa to help mediate a solution to the dam
conflict. The GCC could become a valuable interlocutor for China as Beijing
chooses to ensure the successful completion of its Belt and Road projects in
the Horn of Africa and the larger Middle East. This way, China could replace or
rival the US as a significant power in the region. The dam issue, then, will
not only be a marker of a move away from a US-dominated world but an important
test case for China’s superpower ambitions.
The writer is a political analyst who focuses on the
Middle East and South Asia. He also consults on socio-economic development for
government and private-sector entities.
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