Even
well into 2022, long after the war in Ukraine had started, the media were still
“reporting the last war,” so to speak. The New Yorker headlined a report on the
Bayraktar TB2 drone that was widely considered to have won the 2020
Nagorno-Karabakh war, “
The Turkish Drone That Changed the Nature of Warfare.”
اضافة اعلان
Little
wonder, because the TB2 had proved formidable beyond its size, an unmanned
drone that carried laser-guided bombs. Throughout the six-week war, Azerbaijan
used the TB2 to startling effect, blowing up tanks and troops and then
broadcasting video of the attacks. For a fraction of the cost of conventional
fighter jets, Azerbaijan was able to dominate the airspace above
Nagorno-Karabakh and win a swift victory.
The
rest of the world noticed and militaries began to reassess what role small,
cheap drones might play in future wars. When the Ukraine war started, the
Ukrainian military
used the TB2s to devastating effect, taking out Russian tanks, trains, and even ships – and
gleefully posting the footage to social media. A new era of war had begun,
where a drone costing just a few million dollars could prove highly effective
against one of the world’s most powerful militaries. The financial asymmetry
was frightening.
Yet
the two major wars of this year have shown that, while such asymmetry exists,
the future of war is much more similar to its past.
That is, until the Gaza war. As Israel’s war on Gaza started with a burst of new technology as Hamas used drones to disable surveillance systems, it eventually ossified into a war from another century. Vast parts of Gaza were flattened by aerial bombardment and Israeli troops faced street-by-street battles. As in Ukraine, the civilian toll has been enormous.
Drones
have
fallen away from the Ukrainian battlefield, as Russia's initially chaotic invasion has entrenched
itself into defensive positions and its air defenses have adapted. Ukraine's
much-vaunted
counteroffensive has stalled – stalemated or defeated, depending on who you ask. All along Russia's
vast defensive lines in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv's troops are bogged down, unable
to punch holes through the lines.
Video
taken recently of Ukrainian soldiers pinned down in a field outside Bakhmut
looks like something straight out of World War I: the same bleak, treeless
landscape, the sound of artillery slamming into fields while troops take cover
in muddy ditches, the screams of the wounded. Ukraine's war is brutal and
grinding, its effect on people and landscapes unknown in recent wars.
That
is, until the Gaza war. As Israel’s war on Gaza started with a burst of new
technology as Hamas used drones to disable surveillance systems, it eventually
ossified into a war from another century. Vast parts of Gaza were flattened by
aerial bombardment and Israeli troops faced street-by-street battles. As in
Ukraine, the civilian toll has been enormous.
That
is because, at its heart, war hasn't really changed, and perhaps can't. Yes,
there have been short, swift wars – the first Gulf War, for example. But war in
general is a continuation of political persuasion by other means, and that
means that war invariably affects the entire population, often as a method for
persuading the politicians.
What
has changed with Ukraine and Gaza is that these wars are now fought in full
view of the world and of a watching Western audience. The scale of the
destruction is different, but the nature of it is not.
The
devastation in Gaza or the ruination of
Bakhmut is not new. This is what war looks like, and always has; it is just
that in the West, audiences have so rarely been confronted by its reality.
These two wars have played out across the media for opposite reasons – in
Ukraine, to persuade Western audiences to accept the choices of their
politicians; and in Gaza to persuade them to oppose them. In both cases, the
reality on television and phone screens has been a wake-up call to an audience
thankfully unused to what real conflict looks like up close.
Just
as the future of war hasn't changed that much, nor has the nature of war, which
is ultimately an extension of politics. What hasn't changed in Ukraine or Gaza
is the ultimate importance of what happens off the battlefield.
In Ukraine, the initial idea of arming the Ukrainians was not to allow them to fight a years-long war but to give them the ability to stalemate the Russians and bring them to the negotiating table. In Gaza, it was – or should have been – to destroy Hamas' militant structure, not to punish the whole exclave.
Those
who wage wars easily forget that the purpose of war is not to keep fighting,
but to bring the fighting to an end. Politicians, too easily lulled by the
glory and rhetoric of war, forget this too.
In
Ukraine, the initial idea of arming the Ukrainians was not to allow them to
fight a years-long war but to give them the ability to stalemate the Russians
and bring them to the negotiating table. In Gaza, it was – or should have been
– to destroy Hamas' militant structure, not to punish the whole exclave.
In
both cases, the longer the brutal war has gone on, the harder it has become for
the politicians who are ordering the wars to find ways off the battlefield. A
long war has bolstered the commitment of Ukrainians to fight, especially after
so much loss of human life. The same is true on the Russian side, at least as
regards political commitment: Vladimir Putin can't back down from this very
public fight. The same dynamic is on show in Gaza, with Israeli politicians
using stronger and more forceful rhetoric, even as the war's initial aims
retreat further away.
This
year of conflict has shown that the old wars don't die away; new technology,
new enmities, and new political leaders simply emerge to fight the same old
wars, the same old way, often again and again.
Faisal Al Yafai is currently writing
a book on the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international TV
news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the BBC
and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. X: @FaisalAlYafai
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