Anti-Iranian protests in Afghanistan and the stabbing of
three clerics in Iran threaten to cast a shadow over Iranian efforts to
capitalize on the fallout in Central Asia of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
اضافة اعلان
The protests at Iran’s diplomatic representations in Kabul
and Herat erupted after videos went viral on social media allegedly showing
police beating Afghan refugees in Iran.
Shouting “Mag bar Iran” (Death to Iran), protesters set the
Herat consulate’s door on fire and destroyed security cameras.
Iranian and Taliban officials sought to downplay the
incident. They said “rogue elements” and forces seeking to stoke unrest had
staged the protests.
The protests erupted almost a week after two Iranian Shiite
clerics were killed and a third injured in the conservative religious
stronghold of Mashhad in a knife attack by an allegedly Afghan Salafist
immigrant. The attack occurred at the shrine of Ali Al-Ridha, the eighth Shiite
imam.
The incidents cast a shadow over efforts by Iran to exploit
geopolitical opportunity that initially emerged with the US withdrawal from
Afghanistan in August of last year and has potentially been significantly
enhanced by Russia becoming bogged down in the Ukraine war.
The Ukraine conflict means that Russia is less focused on
Central Asia. It also casts a shadow over Russian security guarantees for
Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, that
are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
And it casts a different light on past statements about
Kazakhstan by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In January, the Kazakh
government asked the CSTO to help end mass anti-government protests.
Russian and other CSTO troops have since left the Central
Asian state, but statements by Putin made weeks before the intervention linger.
Using language reminiscent of his pre-war references to
Ukraine designed to lay the groundwork for an invasion, Putin told a news
conference in December that “Kazakhstan is a Russian-speaking country in the
full sense of the word”.
At the time of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin asserted
that then Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s Soviet-era
Communist party boss, had “performed a unique feat: he has created a state on a
territory where there has never been a state. The Kazakhs never had a state of
their own, and he created it”.
Putin went on to say that Kazakh membership in the
five-nation, post-Soviet Eurasian Economic Union “helps them stay within the
so-called ‘greater Russian world’, which is part of world civilization.”
Central Asian states have been careful not to condemn the
Russian invasion. Still, they have reportedly rebuffed Putin’s request that
they recognize Donetsk and Luhansk, the two breakaway Russian-backed Ukrainian
regions.
Beyond geography and Russia’s security presence in the
region, Central Asians need to consider close economic ties with Russia,
including the flow of remittances by Central Asian migrant workers that have
taken a significant hit because of the Ukraine conflict.
In that environment, Iran, particularly if a revival of the
2015 international nuclear agreement lifts US sanctions, has much to offer
landlocked Central Asia.
US and Iranian negotiators are near a make-or-break point on
resurrecting the agreement that curbed Iran’s nuclear program but was thrown
into disarray after former US President Donald J. Trump withdrew from the
accord in 2018.
Iran believes that its opportunity in Central Asia is
enhanced because it offers one of the few alternatives to a full embrace by
China in the absence of Russia and the US.
Like much of the rest of the world, Iran has refused to
formally recognize the Taliban government as long as it does not demonstrate
inclusivity. Nevertheless, trade with Afghanistan, which hosts multiple land
routes to landlocked Central Asia, remains brisk at approximately $2.9 billion
a year.
Moreover, Iran is discussing with the Taliban the revival of
an ambitious rail project that would initially connect Herat to Khaf in northeastern
Iran but ultimately be extended to connect five Central Asian countries.
Iran has no guarantee that the accord will remain in place if US President Joe Biden loses control of Congress in this year's mid-term elections or a Republican, possibly Trump, wins the 2024 presidential election.
“This rail line can also link Afghanistan with Iran’s
southern ports,” said an Iranian transport official.
The project is part of a proposed US $2bn Five Nations
Railway Corridor (FNRC) which would run 2,000 kilometers from China through
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.
The project takes on added significance as US and European
sanctions against Russia dash Russian, Iranian and Indian hopes for a
North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) that would link India to Afghanistan,
Central Asia, Russia, and Europe through Iranian ports.
Iranians and Indians were touting the corridor before the
Ukraine
invasion as a viable alternative to Egypt’s Suez Canal and
an addition to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
In the past year, Iran has also increased military and
security cooperation with Central Asian states. Last year, Iran and Tajikistan
established a joint military committee that will focus on counterterrorism.
Afghanistan’s neighbors – China, Russia, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – gathered in Tehran in October to discuss
containing the security fallout of the Taliban takeover in Kabul.
Despite taking advantage of Russia’s self-inflicted
predicament, Iran will want to retain good relations with Moscow even if the
nuclear agreement is resurrected and US sanctions are lifted.
Iran has no guarantee that the accord will remain in place
if US President Joe Biden loses control of Congress in this year’s mid-term
elections or a Republican, possibly Trump, wins the 2024 presidential election.
“Maneuvering in Central Asia makes eminent sense for Iran.
However, that will not please multiple players. Iran, therefore, needs to
ensure that it does not close any doors as it fiddles in backyards that
everyone is interested in,” said a Western official.
The writer is an award-winning journalist and scholar, a
senior fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute
and adjunct senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, and the author of the syndicated column and
blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.
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