Ten months after Iraq’s pro-Iran bloc was soundly defeated in Iraqi
parliamentary elections, and less than a week after Shiite cleric Muqtada
Al-Sadr announced his retirement from political life, a stalemate between
Shiites who oppose Tehran and those who support it seems to be leading the
country toward civil war.
اضافة اعلان
Yet this is only
half the story. There is a pattern that connects US policy on Iran and civil
wars in the Middle East. Whenever Washington offers Arab countries up as prizes
to Iran for the freezing of uranium enrichment, those same Arab countries —
usually with significant Shiite populations — plunge into conflict. This
happened in Lebanon in 2008, in Iraq and Yemen in 2014, and is happening again
in Iraq.
Previous civil
wars in the Middle East were preceded by allegations in Washington that
respecting Iranian interests in the region was key to peace. Today, those same
arguments are being made by the same American leaders, only this time they
occupy the White House.
In 2012, US
forces had just withdrawn from Iraq. At the time, Secretary of State Antony
Blinken was serving as the national security advisor to then-vice president Joe
Biden. Blinken oversaw the Obama administration’s Iraq portfolio, making him
the top White House official on Iraq. In a March 2012 speech, Blinken argued
that “Iraq and Iran will inevitably be more intertwined than we, and many of
its neighbors, would like”. While he acknowledged that the majority of its
leaders were resistant to outside influence, including from Iran, crucially, he
did not say the US would help them resist.
Tehran
interpreted that statement as Washington green-lighting its dominance of Iraq.
Coming amid a campaign by then-Iraqi prime minister Nouri Al Maliki to purge
Sunnis from power, it also coincided with the rise of Daesh and eventual
takeover of the northwest in 2014. An inter-Iraqi war ensued, with America
leading a global coalition against Daesh.
In both Iraq and
Iran, the majority is Shiite, which has prompted Tehran to try to use Shiism to
override the national divide, subdue Iraqis, and make them pledge allegiance to
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
But not so fast.
Most Iraqi Shiites have proven to be patriotic, regardless of their religious
affiliation, and as such, have opposed Tehran’s dominance at home. These Iraqis
expressed their sentiment when they roundly defeated Iranian incumbent
lawmakers in parliamentary elections in October, leading the pro-Tehran
parliamentary bloc to shrink to 15 members from 75.
Losing its
majority, the pro-Iran coalition tried to torpedo election results but failed.
It then hoped to kill a parliamentary quorum, but an anti-Iran majority formed,
and in January, anti-Tehran Speaker Mohammad Al-Halbousi was reelected.
A civil war in Iraq might not go Iran’s way and could even drag on, threatening Iraq and possibly shutting down its export of 4 million barrels of oil a day, thus shaking the global economy that is already starved of energy because of the Russian war in Ukraine.
Then, just when
the anti-Iran majority was about to elect a president and designate a prime
minister, the Iran bloc convinced the Iraqi supreme court to ignore democratic
rules and declare that a supermajority of two-thirds was required for a quorum
to elect a president and form a Cabinet. In parliamentary systems, like in
Britain, only a simple majority is required to govern. Supermajorities are for
big decisions, such as constitutional amendments.
As Iraq’s
stalemate persisted, the Iranian bloc caught another break with the clumsiness
and inexperience of its opponents. Hoping to make a splash and force the hand
of the Iran bloc, Sadr instructed his bloc of 73 lawmakers, the biggest in
parliament, to resign. But instead of things shaking out Sadr’s way, the
pro-Iran coalition anointed its losing candidates as replacements, obtaining a
majority. Tehran’s allies then changed position — from insisting that anything
short of a national unity Cabinet would lead to civil war, to speeding up the
process of electing a president and forming a Cabinet regardless of minority
blocs.
To stop Iran’s
march toward absolute power in Iraq, Sadr was left with one tool: taking to the
streets. On Monday, he announced his “final withdrawal” from politics, which
prompted deadly protests by supporters. But by using this card, Sadr
inadvertently played Tehran’s game of having non-state actors rule using brute
force, as in Lebanon and Yemen.
Unlike in
Lebanon and Yemen, however, Iran’s partisans have no monopoly over the Shiites.
A civil war in Iraq might not go Iran’s way and could even drag on, threatening
Iraq and possibly shutting down its export of 4 million barrels of oil a day,
thus shaking the global economy that is already starved of energy because of
the Russian war in Ukraine.
But then, as a
reward for Iran agreeing to the revival of a skewed nuclear deal, Washington
might again offer Iraq as a prize to sweeten the pot for Tehran. One way
America could do this is by starving Sadr’s militias and Iraq’s government
forces of arms, while allowing Tehran’s militias to receive all the support
they need to win the war.
Iraq is about to
plunge into a civil war that could spill beyond its borders. Such a war will
shake the region and the world economy. Washington is well advised to think of
an unfolding Iraqi civil war as a threat to its national interests and global
peace — not as a reward that can entice Iran into signing a nuclear deal.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research
institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Twitter:
@hahussain. Syndication Bureau.
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