On March 1, 2024, the
Islamic Republic of Iran will hold elections for the sixth term of the Assembly
of Experts. The major responsibility of this 88-member body is to designate the
future supreme leader after the current leader’s death or when he becomes
incapable of fulfilling the position’s responsibilities.
اضافة اعلان
At present, there is
no verified information about the health of 84-year-old Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei. However, since the Sixth Assembly of Experts will continue its term
until 2032, this next assembly may very well be charged with designating
Khamenei’s successor if the Islamic regime continues to rule Iran until then.
The supreme leader’s role in the succession process
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
structured in a way that the current leader has a decisive influence on the
selection of his successor. According to the constitution, all candidates for
the Assembly of Experts must be qualified clerics, and their eligibility must
be approved by the jurists of the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council
consists of six Shi’ite jurists and six legal scholars. Each of those Shi’ite
jurists is directly appointed by the supreme leader, while the council’s legal
scholars are all chosen by parliament from individuals pre-selected by the head
of the judiciary, himself appointed by the supreme leader.
According to the election law of the Assembly of
Experts, legal scholars of the Guardian Council have no right to intervene in
approving the qualifications of candidates for the Assembly of Experts; this
responsibility lies solely with the six Shi’ite jurists of the Guardian
Council, who, as noted above, are directly appointed by the supreme leader.
In this context, the Shi’ite jurists of the Guardian
Council will undoubtedly reject the qualifications of any candidates to sit on
the next Assembly of Experts whose views may differ in certain areas from those
of Ayatollah Khamenei.
“In this context, the Shi’ite jurists of the Guardian Council will undoubtedly reject the qualifications of any candidates to sit on the next Assembly of Experts whose views may differ in certain areas from those of Ayatollah Khamenei.”
All that said, the role of the sitting supreme leader
in the process of selecting his successor will not necessarily be confined to
formal processes. During his leadership, Khamenei has not only intervened in
macro-level policy matters but has also consistently engaged in plenty of minor
government issues as well, from vaccination regimens and television programs to
sports teams and school textbooks. Many of the supreme leader’s interventions
have been directly related to his growing concerns about the future of the
Islamic Republic. It is nearly inconceivable that a leader accustomed to
involvement in such a broad spectrum of major and minor issues would refrain
from intervening in the most crucial matter related to the fate of the Islamic
Republic, i.e., the issue of leadership succession.
The appointment, in August 1989, of Khamenei as the
successor to Ruhollah Khomeini resulted from the claim of officials like Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then-speaker of parliament, and some other influential
figures in the Assembly of Experts, who ‘testified’ that Ayatollah Khomeini had
previously expressed interest in Khamenei succeeding him. It is uncertain
whether a similar event will occur after Khamenei’s death. Nevertheless, it is
unlikely he will pass away without somehow recording his opinion about those
who should or should not become the next leader. If such documentation exists,
quotes from Khamenei will play an important role in determining his successor
in the Assembly of Experts.
The actual status of the assembly
In general, it should be noted that the Assembly of
Experts, despite its considerable formal authority, has practically served only
as an affirming body for the views of the supreme leader. According to Iran’s
constitution, this assembly has the authority to supervise the performance of
the supreme leader and can even remove him in the event of his incapacity to
fulfill his duties or failure to meet the conditions of leadership.
However, the sessions of the Assembly of Experts, which
are usually held twice a year, have mainly been ceremonial occasions for
members to express enthusiastic support for the supreme leader. The assembly’s
‘supervisory’ responsibilities concerning the supreme leader have been
restricted to issuing similar statements endorsing Ayatollah Khamenei’s views
and praising his leadership. During Ayatollah Khomeini’s era as well, the
Assembly of Experts lacked a true supervisory role in overseeing the supreme leader’s
performance. Nevertheless, following the ascent of Khamenei, the assembly
experienced an even greater decline in its position, becoming considerably
weaker than before.
Several pivotal moments mark the evolution of the
Assembly of Experts’ role. The crucial turning point took place during the
assembly’s session on June 4, 1989, when Ali Khamenei was appointed as the
successor to Ruhollah Khomeini. The first constitution of the Islamic Republic
stated that the leader must be a marja-e taqlid, meaning he should have reached
the highest position in the hierarchy of Shi’ite clergy. Yet at the time of
Khomeini’s death, Khamenei did not hold such a position, nor did he even claim
to have such a status.
Nonetheless, advocates of his leadership orchestrated a
politically motivated vote, claiming Khomeini’s preference for Khamenei’s
leadership. The result was the unlawful appointment of Khamenei until a
revision in the constitution took place. By endorsing a choice that was
explicitly against the constitution at the time, the assembly essentially
acknowledged a decline in its legal status. Then, on July 28 of the same year,
the constitution underwent amendments, one of which involved eliminating the
requirement of being a marja-e taqlid from the leadership criteria.
Consequently, on August 6, the Assembly of Experts convened a new session and
elected Khamenei as the permanent leader of the Islamic Republic.
Another turning point occurred during the elections of
the second term of the Assembly of Experts, in October 1990. In the first
assembly’s elections, in December 1982, candidates could qualify by receiving
endorsements from two senior Shi’ite clerics. However, three months before the
end of the assembly’s first term, its members changed the body’s internal
regulations, transferring the responsibility of approving its own candidates’
qualifications to the Guardian Council. Exploiting this power, the Guardian
Council rejected a significant number of candidates from the left-wing
religious faction, thereby securing the dominance of Khamenei’s right-wing
allies within the next Assembly of Experts.
Yet another pivotal moment occurred during the
elections for the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts in February 2016. Like
previous assembly elections, the vast majority of candidates who could
potentially disagree with the supreme leader were rejected by the Guardian
Council. However, a coalition of political forces aligned with Hassan Rouhani
and Hashemi Rafsanjani organized a campaign with the goal of transforming the
elections into a symbolic confrontation with the dominant clerics in the
Assembly of Experts. In Tehran, the Guardian Council rejected most figures from
this coalition, resulting in an insufficient number of candidates to form a
complete list of 16 members. Consequently, this coalition sought to at least
eliminate Khamenei’s most influential political allies from the assembly,
including the Then-Head of the Assembly of Experts, Mohammad Yazdi, the most
prominent theorist supporting Khamenei, Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, and the
Secretary of the Guardian Council, Ahmad Jannati.
"The experience of 2016 strengthened the view that even the most conservative efforts to change the composition of the Assembly of Experts or possibly influence the selection of the next supreme leader are fundamentally futile.”
In the end, Mesbah Yazdi and Yazdi were eliminated, and
Jannati was given the lowest position among the elected members from Tehran,
while Hashemi Rafsanjani and Rouhani secured the first and third positions,
respectively.
However, this campaign only achieved symbolic results.
In response to the protest campaign of Tehran voters, the fifth assembly
selected Ahmad Jannati as its chairman and, in practice, remained as hardline
as previous assemblies. The experience of 2016 strengthened the view that even
the most conservative efforts to change the composition of the Assembly of
Experts or possibly influence the selection of the next supreme leader are
fundamentally futile. It can be presumed that this experience will be one of the
factors affecting the electoral behavior of political forces and ordinary
voters in the assembly’s 2024 elections.
The impact of
the IRGC
Another institution that will play a decisive role in
determining the future leader is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
As the most powerful military-security force and the largest economic cartel in
the Islamic Republic, the IRGC has all the necessary tools to exert influence
over the Assembly of Experts and manage those few members who may not align with
the majority.
It is important to consider the IRGC’s role in the
process of selecting the future leader as a complement to that of the current
supreme leader, not as a competitor. Although there may be dissatisfaction
among some IRGC personnel with the current state of the country, the commanders
of this force have been in complete harmony with the supreme leader so far.
Indeed, among the government institutions in Iran, it is difficult to identify
one that has benefited more from Khamenei’s and his predecessor’s policies or
been more effective in implementing the supreme leader’s policies than the
IRGC.
It is undeniable that during periods of internal
divisions within the Iranian regime, when factions have held differing opinions
or conflicting interests with Khamenei, the IRGC has consistently aligned
itself with the supreme leader. Over the past three decades, especially during
the presidencies of Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, some analysts
both inside and outside Iran speculated that there might be significant rifts
within the IRGC, between supporters and opponents of Khamenei. However, it has
been proven over time that such assumptions were baseless.
It is worth recalling that during the second term of
Hashemi Rafsanjani and both terms of Khatami and Rouhani, the IRGC opposed the
policies of the sitting presidents, who were accused of disobedience to the
supreme leader. Even Ahmadinejad, who enjoyed the full support of the IRGC
during his first term when he was entirely obedient to the supreme leader,
faced severe opposition from the Revolutionary Guards after he started
disobeying Khamenei on certain issues. The current president, Ebrahim Raisi, has
been in complete lockstep with the supreme leader and, therefore, has not faced
significant challenges from the IRGC so far.
"Given these realities, it can be expected that during the selection of the next supreme leader, the role of this military force will be to consolidate the leadership of the individual favored by Khamenei, someone with whom the IRGC commanders are unlikely to have any issues."
Given these realities, it can be expected that during
the selection of the next supreme leader, the role of this military force will
be to consolidate the leadership of the individual favored by Khamenei, someone
with whom the IRGC commanders are unlikely to have any issues.
A ‘leadership
council?’
One imaginable scenario in the post-Khamenei era is the
formation of a de facto leadership council. The likelihood of such a collective
leadership is, of course, very minimal.
In the first constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, the Assembly of Experts had the authority to choose either an individual
leader or a leadership council consisting of three or five members. With a
constitutional amendment in 1989, the term ‘leadership council’ was removed
from the text, and the Assembly of Experts was obliged to select an individual
as a successor in case of the supreme leader’s death or incapacity to perform
his duties. The amended constitution remains in effect to date.
However, it is conceivable that following the supreme
leader’s death, circumstances may arise where, in practice, a three-member
council assumes leadership tasks, even if its formal name is not explicitly
stated as the ‘leadership council.’
Article 111 of the current constitution states, “In
case of the death, resignation, or dismissal of the leader, the Assembly of
Experts must, as soon as possible, take steps to appoint and introduce a new
leader. Until the appointment of the new leader, a council consisting of the
president, the head of the judiciary, and one of the [Shi’ite] jurists of the
Guardian Council who is elected by the Expediency Discernment Council, will
temporarily assume all the duties of the leadership.” It should be noted that
the Expediency Discernment Council is a supreme government council, most of
whose members are directly appointed by the supreme leader. One of its
responsibilities is formulating the macro policies of the Islamic regime and
presenting them to the leader for final approval.
Article 111 also considers this three-member council
temporary until the appointment of a new singular leader but does not specify
how much time the members of the Assembly of Experts have to reach a decision,
and what will happen if they fail to agree on an individual within a certain
period. This issue becomes more crucial when considering that, according to the
internal regulations of the Assembly of Experts, at least two-thirds of its
members must vote for the new supreme leader. In other words, as long as no
individual receives the two-thirds majority, the three-member council mentioned
in Article 111 can indefinitely assume the leadership duties.
This three-member council can, if deemed necessary,
even initiate a referendum to amend the constitution, “after obtaining the
approval of three-fourths of the members of the Expediency Discernment
Council.”
Practically speaking, however, the likelihood of
two-thirds of the members of the Assembly of Experts failing to reach an
agreement on the appointment of the next supreme leader is very minimal. As
emphasized earlier, the current supreme leader of the Islamic Republic
naturally strives, through the Guardian Council, to ensure that individuals not
aligned with his views are not members of the Assembly of Experts.
Additionally, if internal disagreements do arise in the Assembly of Experts, it
is expected that the IRGC will use its formal and informal levers of power to
pressure the members of this assembly and compel them to choose a new supreme
leader as quickly as possible.
Nevertheless, in a comprehensive analysis of the
post-Khamenei era, if the Islamic Republic is not overthrown, the probability
of a delayed selection of the supreme leader’s successor cannot be entirely
dismissed.
Marie
Abdi is an Iranian political researcher focusing on the Islamic Republic's
domestic and regional strategies.
Disclaimer:
Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Jordan News' point of view.
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