On February 28, Turkey triggered the Montreux Convention, not used
since World War II, and closed the Turkish Straits to military ships. This one
move interrupted Russia’s maritime logistical supply line to Syria, interfered
with its ability to rotate naval assets in the Mediterranean, and prevented
Moscow from bringing additional warships to the Black Sea. Russia can no longer
supply its Syrian operation or deliver defense exports to its customers using
navy ships. However, close observation of traffic through the Turkish Straits
reveals that Russia is continuing its naval operations in the Mediterranean and
Black seas.
اضافة اعلان
The current
closure of the Turkish Straits under Montreux applies only to naval vessels.
Free transit through the straits for commercial purposes continues. Russia is
abusing this distinction by using civilian merchant vessels as naval
auxiliaries to supply logistics to its military operations in Syria and
Ukraine.
This is not the first time Moscow has done this
either. At the height of its Syria campaign, the war effort required more
supplies than the Russian Navy, or Voyenno-Morskoy Flot, could carry. Russia
bought old civilian cargo ships from Turkey, reflagged them, and began using
them for its war. And now, Russia is once again using civilian ships to supply
its military campaigns in Syria and Libya, and to fulfill existing contracts,
such as Rosatom’s nuclear power plant construction in El Dabaa, Egypt, or
exporting defense products to Algeria. Russia is also plundering commodities
from occupied territories in Ukraine, especially from the port of Sevastopol’s
Avlita grain terminal. It is absurd that Russia has been allowed to weaponize
commercial trade by illegally blockading the Odessa and Chornomorsk harbors,
while also profiting from the sale of stolen Ukrainian grain, exported from an
occupied Ukrainian port.
Currently, Russia is using five types of civilian
merchant ships for war:
1. Cargo vessels owned by logistics company Oboronlogistika, part of the
Russian ministry of defense. These purportedly civilian ships, such as Pizhma,
Sparta, Sparta II, Ursa Major (x-Sparta III), and Sparta IV, regularly carry
military cargo from Novorossiysk to Syria and from Baltic ports like Ust-Luga
and Kaliningrad to Novorossiysk.
2. Russian-flag roll-on/roll-off cargo ships (ro-ros) of “private” Russian
companies like Moscow-based M Leasing, which are owned by or working on behalf
of the Russian government, such as Adler, Angara, and Lady Mariia, carry
defense exports and transport weapons. For example, Russian-flag Lady Mariia
carried arms from Kaliningrad to Novorossiysk. The same ship very recently
carried weapons from Novorossiysk all the way to Myanmar, another conflict
zone.
3. Older, non-Russian-flag ro-ros not seen in this region before but brought
back into service and flying flags of convenience. These ships, such as
Kocatepe (x-Varyag), Barbaros, Hızır, and Şampiyon Trabzonspor, now frequent
Novorossiysk harbor, and are likely working as contractors for the Russian
government. These ships, which carried military cargo in the past, are now
prolonging the war in Ukraine by providing revenue and even transporting
weapons for Russia’s use.
4. Russian-flag tankers regularly carry jet fuel to Khmeimim Air Base in Syria.
Several smaller tankers, especially Russian-flag Sig and Yaz, have been
documented transporting aviation jet fuel to Baniyas, Syria for years. They are
clearly not functioning as civilian ships and should be treated as Russian Navy
auxiliary vessels. Preventing them from transiting the Turkish Straits would
immediately ground the Russian Air Force in the Syrian theater. As Khmeimim is
also a refueling stop for flights to Russian military operations in the Central
African Republic, Mali, and Venezuela, stopping these two ships would immediately
disrupt Russian military operations globally.
5. Russian or Syrian-flag bulk carriers that transport commodities like wheat,
barley, or corn, such as Mikhail Nenashev, Matros Pozynich, Laodicea, Souria,
and Finikia.
Russia has found a way to work around the current
closure of the Turkish Straits by supplying logistics to its military
operations in Syria or Ukraine using supposedly private companies and civilian
ships. The use of civilian merchant vessels for war violates the spirit of the
Montreux mechanism that was used to close the Turkish Straits. Even if it is
legal, it is not acceptable and should not be allowed.
Closer inspection is required of vessels transiting the Turkish Straits. NATO should be more vigilant about inspecting ships possibly carrying arms.
When Ukraine wins the war, the balance of power in
the Black Sea region will change fundamentally. Having exposed its own profound
operational problems, Russia will no longer enjoy the perception of
superiority. Expect more challenges, especially from Black Sea countries.
Ukraine will emerge from the war stronger, with an experienced army and coastal
defenses strengthened by new Western anti-ship weapons that will further reduce
Russia’s ability to patrol coastal waters. Both Romania and Georgia are
interested in a greater US and NATO presence in the Black Sea.
Turkey’s approach to Russia will change too. Its
navy is already the strongest in the Black Sea, powered by new frigates armed
with new indigenous technologies, and a growing submarine fleet that already
outnumbers Russia’s Black Sea Fleet three to one. It also has new gas fields in
the Black Sea to protect. These changes are likely to affect implementation of
the Montreux Convention.
When Montreux was written, the Black Sea was
understood to be under the control of the Soviet Union and Turkey, with the
Soviet Union superior. Everything has changed now. Ukraine, Romania, and Georgia
will want to review the limitations that Montreux currently imposes on ships
from non-Black Sea countries in its waters.
For now, Turkey must use all its means to end the
war sooner by choking off Russia’s illegal activity and revenues. Closer
inspection is required of vessels transiting the Turkish Straits. NATO should
be more vigilant about inspecting ships possibly carrying arms. Ro-ros bound
for the Black Sea that are likely carrying suspicious cargo should be boarded
and inspected in the international waters of the Mediterranean. Closure of the
Turkish Straits to merchant ships working for the Russian war effort should be
considered. Turkey should prevent civilian merchant vessels from supplying
Russia’s wars by carrying military cargo.
Action must also be taken to re-establish global
food security. Russia is stealing Ukrainian commodities on an industrial scale
and selling them; profits from these illegitimate sales extend the war. Great
amounts of stolen commodities end up in Turkey, some even carried inexplicably
by the Syrian government shipping company SYRIAMAR. Buyers, including companies
in Turkey, are wrong to get involved in this illegal trade. Turkey should
instead focus on rebuilding Ukraine. While Russia continues to blockade
Ukraine’s most essential ports at Odesa and Chornomorsk, its ships should be
denied commercial access to the Turkish Straits.
The
writer is a geopolitical analyst based in Istanbul, where he runs the Bosphorus
Observer, a consultancy analyzing maritime activity on the Turkish Straits. He
is also a non-resident scholar with MEI’s Turkey Program.
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