In late February, when Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine,
regional analysts began speculating how the fighting would impact Moscow’s
military presence in Syria. The guesswork did not last long. Faced with
unexpected resilience from Ukraine’s army, Russia reportedly began to withdraw
infantry, aviation, and engineering units from various parts of Syria.
اضافة اعلان
As a result, many assumed that Moscow’s willingness
— or even its ability — to support Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad had been
wounded by overextension in Ukraine. The conclusion: Russia’s military role in
Syria would be significantly decreased.
But recent developments on the ground tell a much
different story. In addition to reinforcing its forces in northern Syria in
response to Turkish threats of a cross-border military operation, Moscow is
carrying out operations as before with joint air force drills with Damascus
over the war-torn country, and humanitarian aid to people in Sweida and
Hassakeh.
Taken together, these activities suggest that
despite decreasing its presence in Syria, Russia is determined to mobilize its
forces there to maintain its means of influence.
Since September 2015, an estimated 63,000 Russian
military personnel have been deployed to Syria. While the number of soldiers
currently stationed in the country is likely much lower, what’s important to
recognize is that Moscow does not actually need to keep many troops there to
maintain an operational advantage. That’s because the level of active fighting
has dramatically decreased since March 2020, after the ceasefire brokered by
Russia and Türkiye in Idlib. With somewhat frozen frontlines, Russia can recall
units from Syria without fear of a pushback from opposition forces.
A more accurate measure of Russia’s influence in
Syria is its ability to stabilize the fractured north, and so far, Moscow’s war
in Ukraine has had little effect on that mission.
In fact, Russia has increased its activities in the
northern part of the country to deter Türkiye from carrying out a new military
operation against Kurdish factions based there. In late May, Moscow deployed
soldiers, six Ka-52 “Alligator” attack helicopters, and two Su-34 fighter
bombers to the Qamishli airport, according to Syrian media. It also deployed
military convoys with dozens of vehicles to the cities of Manbij and Tel
Rifaat.
More importantly, Russia has increased its air force
activities over the Syria-Türkiye border as well as the frontlines in Hassakeh
and Aleppo governorates. The aim of these activities is to ensure that a new
Turkish offensive cannot take place without a green light from Moscow.
A more accurate measure of Russia’s influence in Syria is its ability to stabilize the fractured north, and so far, Moscow’s war in Ukraine has had little effect on that mission.
Meanwhile, Moscow remains engaged in mediating
between the Syrian regime and Kurdish fighters in the northeast. Despite the
absence of active hostilities between Damascus and Kurdish soldiers, clashes
are still common in the region, and Russia’s ability to ease tensions is often
tested. The latest round of Russian-led negotiations occurred in April, when
Russia succeeded in getting rival Kurdish and Syrian government forces to lift
sieges held against each other. The deal demonstrates Moscow’s continued
ability to act as a mediator.
Russia also appears determined to stand between Iran
and Israel to prevent any escalation between those two states. For instance,
Russia has allowed Israeli warplanes to use Syrian airspace to target
Iranian-linked sites and arms shipments in Syria. Russia has also continued to
prevent Iran from deploying its allies close to Israel’s borders.
At the same time, however, Russia has pressured
Israel to limit airstrikes in Syria, in deference to Iran’s interests;
reportedly fired S-300 missiles at Israeli jets over Syria; and carried out
joint patrols along the occupied Golan Heights in simulated confrontation with
“hostile” warplanes and drones.
Beyond its military presence, Russia’s ability to
influence events in Syria is contingent on the financial support it provides to
allied militias. While information about Russia’s funding to local militias in
Syria is scant, according to Syrian news websites, Moscow does appear to have
transferred roughly $250,000 in May to pay some 16,000 fighters affiliated with
local armed groups.
How long this support will last is unclear.
Financial difficulties caused by the war in Ukraine could hamper Moscow’s
ability to continue funding a second war effort. If Russian money dries up,
some militias might agree to be paid by Iran or the Syrian regime, but former
rebels in the south operating under the umbrella of the Fifth Corps, which
remains hostile to Tehran and Damascus, are unlikely to do so peacefully. Such
a development could further destabilize southern Syria, which in turn would
threaten Jordan’s national security across the border through a new wave of
refugees and smuggling. Hence, Russia’s continued involvement in Syria has
security implications beyond the troubled north.
Moscow’s shifting role in Syria will remain a topic
of intense regional speculation. But while the war in Ukraine is stretching
Russia’s military capacity and altering its strategic priorities, it’s hard to
imagine any scenario in which Moscow completely abandons its role in
maintaining Syria’s fragile status quo. On the contrary, Russia’s
Ukraine-fueled withdrawal from Syria, once eagerly predicted, now seems like
wistful conjecture.
The
writer is a Syrian columnist and a consulting associate fellow of Chatham
House’s Middle East and North Africa program.
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