For months,
when it came to Africa, Ukraine was the war that dared not speak its name.
Russia and the West were jockeying for influence on the continent, peddling
deals and diplomatic support, but rarely referencing their charm offensives in
the context of the Ukraine war. Now, the covers have been thrown back.
اضافة اعلان
Speaking
last week after his second mini-tour of the continent, Russia’s foreign
minister
Sergei Lavrov explicitly linked his
travels to the war. “Despite the anti-Russian orgy orchestrated by Washington …
we are strengthening relations with the international majority,” he declared.
Lavrov took
two trips to countries on the continent in late January and early February,
together taking in seven African nations. In between, the US Treasury
Secretary
Janet Yellen visited three countries.
But those are only the most visible signs of cooperation. What once was
political sideshow has become a real scramble for votes and support from the
continent.
Africa has
become a political battleground for Russia and the West since the Ukraine
invasion started. The focus of this battle is two-fold: it takes place in the
presidential palaces across the continent, where bilateral deals are hammered
out. But it also takes place in the rarefied atmosphere of the UN, where the
contest for African votes is combative.
The West, for all the talk of a decline in influence on the African continent, still has some powerful cards to play. In the autumn, having brought back the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit after an eight-year hiatus, Washington played two of them.
In March
last year, shortly after the invasion, the UN held a vote condemning Russia’s
invasion, seen as a test of global political opinion. The largest group of
abstentions came from the African continent. In fact,
half of all African states abstained,
something Moscow took great solace from.
In
September, Russia held referendums in four occupied regions of eastern Ukraine,
paving the way for their complete annexation. In the subsequent vote at the UN
condemning the annexation,
19 African countries abstained —
two more than in the March vote.
Such
apparent success did not go unnoticed in the West. And the West, for all the
talk of a decline in influence on the African continent, still has some
powerful cards to play. In the autumn, having brought back the
US-Africa Leaders’ Summit after
an eight-year hiatus, Washington played two of them.
Joe Biden publicly backed two institutional
changes that African countries have long called for: a seat for the continent
at the G20 group of the richest economies, and two – that’s right, two –
permanent seats for Africa on the UN Security Council.
While the
first change has been in the works for some time — and may even happen this
year, given the momentum towards better relations with Africa in the wake of
the war – the second would be significant and seismic. At the moment, the
Security Council only has five permanent members, all of whom wield a veto (as
well as nuclear arsenals). The addition of two more veto-holders would
radically alter the balance of the council. (It would also open up the council
to further change: it would be hard to argue India shouldn’t also have a seat, for
example.)
Regardless
of how such changes would be managed, the mere fact that the US president
backed them is significant. Just last month, the foreign ministers of
France and Germany also backed that
position.
It is also
very clever politics, because it forces Russia into a position where it needs
to clarify whether it, too, agrees with the change. So far, Moscow has declined
to back the change, something that could become a bigger sticking point in
Africa-Russia relations.
This scramble for support has, however, placed individual African countries in tricky positions, as they seek to maximize the political opportunities afforded, while also preparing for the day after the war ends and — presumably — the attention dissipates.
This
scramble for support has, however, placed individual African countries in
tricky positions, as they seek to maximize the political opportunities
afforded, while also preparing for the day after the war ends and — presumably
— the attention dissipates.
No country
better illustrates this conundrum than South Africa. In both UN votes last
year, South Africa abstained. In the recent round of visits, it was the only
country visited by both Lavrov and Yellen — within a day of each other.
The dilemma
for Pretoria is felt in a less acute form across the continent. Do they back
the general, institutional changes the West is offering in return for
distancing themselves from Russia, or do they take the concrete, bilateral
benefits Moscow is offering now?
Pretoria
appears to have made that choice, agreeing to host joint naval exercises with
Russia and China, starting this week and extending to the anniversary of the
start of the invasion. Yet it would be wrong to see anything definitive in
that; South Africa, like other countries, may simply be hedging its bets,
unwilling to commit too easily to a side in a far-away war.
The push
into Africa is real. It may not quite be the “all in on Africa” message Biden
gave African leaders in December, but there is no doubt the continent is being
offered real and tangible political benefits in return for political support in
the Ukraine war.
Ironically,
the very existence of this tug-of-war proves the central argument that Moscow
has been advancing: that it is far from alone in facing down the West. Despite
the suggestion that many African countries are supporting Russia out of animus
toward the West, what is much more likely is that, having been ignored for too
long, African states are responding positively to outside powers who have,
finally, begun to appreciate their worth.
Faisal Al-Yafai is currently writing a book on
the Middle East and is a frequent commentator on international
TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets such as The Guardian and the
BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Asia,
and Africa. Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai
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