The war in Ukraine has been burning for more than 100 days. But outside of the
West, the conflict is a “quiet” war — burning away somewhere over the horizon,
but not consuming the same political focus as it does in Western Europe.
اضافة اعلان
A survey by the Economist Group found that
two-thirds of the world’s population live in countries that are neutral or
Russia-leaning when it comes to the Ukraine war. In other words, for most
outside of the West, this war is someone else’s problem.
Its consequences, however, are not. The war has
disrupted wheat supplies, raised energy prices worldwide and compounded global
inflation. Many countries outside Europe are suffering grave consequences
because of the war. The mood is shifting away from sympathy for Ukraine.
Even within the West, which has remained
impressively united, cracks are beginning to show.
The first such cracks appeared over the issue of
Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Turkey, a long-standing NATO member with the
second-largest armed forces of the alliance, has refused to sign-off on the
plan unless the two countries end their support for Kurdish militants.
The most high-profile
western leader to break ranks is Emmanuel Macron, who said at the weekend the
West “must not humiliate Russia,” so that after the war ends, there could be
diplomatic contact.
Unsurprisingly, the comments led to anger from Kyiv,
concerned that such statements open up the possibility of eventual territorial
concessions to Russia — a diplomatic reward, in effect, for waging war.
But Macron’s comments highlight a particular strain
of thinking within European capitals, one which fears the Ukraine war is becoming
a war without end and that Russia needs to be offered an “off-ramp.” Others who
appear to have similar concerns are the Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi,
who started off maintaining the hard European line. But as polls in Italy show
little public support for Italy’s involvement, Draghi has shifted towards
advocating a negotiated settlement.
Others will surely follow. One hundred days of war
can easily turn into 200, and then 300. Indeed even the “optimistic” scenario
put forward last month by the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence envisaged
the war ending by the end of the year — in other words, 200 more days. From a
European perspective, that does not sound optimistic.
Gradually, then, the West is splitting into two
camps, a realist camp and a more hawkish camp.
The ultimate position of the realist camp was
expressed by the former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, who told the World
Economic Forum last month that Ukraine would have to concede territory to
Russia to end the war. Realists look at the economic pain — inflation in both
the US and UK is at decades-long highs — and the risk of escalation and look
for a way out.
The hawkish camp is led by London and Washington.
Though not explicitly stated, the Anglo-American position is to keep supporting
Ukraine with military equipment and intelligence, in order to deal as harsh a
blow to Russia’s plans as possible. This will both strengthen Ukraine’s
eventual hand at the negotiating table, and deter Russia from any future
aggression towards other European countries — in particular, the vulnerable EU
states of the Baltics.
Like in Syria, Kyiv would find its territory full of foreign troops it cannot expel and reliant on governments abroad to prop it up.
Yet even this hawkish position has a limit. Just
last month, the New York Times published an editorial in which it warned
Ukraine would have to make “painful territorial decisions.” Russia’s open
threats last week to hit “decision-making centers” if US-supplied long-range
missiles were used against Russian territory will also give western leaders
pause for thought. (In case there was any ambiguity over the threat, Russia’s
former prime minister Dmitry Medvedev explained that “the final decision-making
centers in this case … are not in Kyiv”.)
What both these camps have in common is the belief
that the Ukraine war has to end with a negotiated settlement, even if the shape
of that settlement is fiercely disputed. But after 100 days of war, a
negotiated settlement looks further away than at the start of the conflict.
What looks increasingly likely, instead, is a permanently simmering conflict,
one in which Kyiv never regains all its territory, and Russian troops never
leave. In other words, it could look a lot like Syria.
From Moscow’s perspective, a Ukraine not in total
control of its territory might be a “reasonable” outcome. Vladimir Putin has
staked his political prestige on victory in Ukraine, something the West is
anxious to deny him. But a war without end might eventually drag the West —
after 200 days or after two years, especially as a US presidential election
inches closer — towards some sort of compromise.
Once the pain
becomes too much to bear, especially if a brutal winter bites Europe hard, the
West may well be willing to end some sanctions and tolerate some troops left
behind. Like in Syria, Kyiv would find its territory full of foreign troops it
cannot expel and reliant on governments abroad to prop it up.
No doubt, in that moment, it will seem a compromise
worth making. But it will not be. A long war in Ukraine may be a sticking
plaster on Putin’s disastrous invasion, but it would create a permanent wound
on Europe’s borders.
This writer is currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent
commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets
such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern
Europe, Asia, and Africa.
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