Russia’s war in Ukraine has ostracized Moscow from the
international community, with Western leaders presenting a united front against
President Vladimir Putin. Closer to home, the Kremlin has more influence,
particularly in the South Caucasus. But even there, tensions between two of
Moscow’s allies – Azerbaijan and Armenia – are threatening to weaken Russia’s
hand.
اضافة اعلان
Just two days before Russia launched its march toward Kyiv,
Putin met with Azerbaijan’s leader, Ilham Aliyev, in Moscow. The two presidents
signed a 43-point “allied cooperation” agreement, which nominally strengthened
Russia’s position in the energy-rich country. It also made Russia, at least on
paper, an ally of Azerbaijan – and of Azerbaijan’s archenemy, Armenia.
For 30 years, the Kremlin has acted as a mediator in a
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous
border area under Armenian control but internationally recognized as part of
Azerbaijan. In 2020, a bloody 44-day war ended with Azerbaijan restoring
sovereignty over much of the region and with Armenia, Russia’s ally in the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union,
making concessions to Azerbaijan.
According to the November 2020 ceasefire agreement, Armenia
must unblock all economic and transportation ties in the region. This will
enable Azerbaijan to complete construction of the Nakhchivan transportation
corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor) by 2023, which would allow Baku
to connect its Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic via Armenian territory without
Armenian checkpoints. The corridor could eventually become part of China’s Belt
and Road Initiative, and give Azerbaijan a land route to Turkey while
connecting Russia and Armenia through Azerbaijan’s territory.
Armenia, however, has different priorities. Yerevan is set
on the construction of the International North-South Transport Corridor, which
would connect the country with Russia through Georgia. Russia’s weakened
position due to its war in Ukraine could lead the Kremlin to push Armenia to
speed up construction of the Nakhchivan Corridor, but Armenia might resist,
given that it views the “allied cooperation” agreement between Russia and
Azerbaijan as a de facto stab in the back.
The deal signed between Putin and Aliyev states that “armed
forces of the two countries will deepen their interaction, including by holding
joint operational and combat training activities”. Russia and Azerbaijan might
also consider providing each other with military assistance, which could become
relevant if the war in Ukraine continues to go poorly for Moscow. Collaboration
of this type would undoubtedly give Baku additional leverage over Yerevan.
The problem for Azerbaijan’s leaders, however, is that the
West could pressure them to impose sanctions on Russia. Azerbaijan Airlines and
its subsidiary, Buta Airways, have suspended all flights to the Russian
Federation, while Russia’s state airline, Aeroflot, has also stopped flying
abroad. These severed links will result in even deeper isolation for Russia, and
cause pain to the Armenian and Azerbaijani economies.
Aware that Russian support comes with strings, Armenia has
started normalizing relations with Turkey – a country that could benefit from
Moscow’s isolation, while Azerbaijan and Turkey officially became allies in
June 2021, after Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed the
Shusha Declaration on mutual cooperation. Ankara also increased its presence in
the Caucasus following the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Nominally, Azerbaijan is allied with Russia and Turkey, but
in practice, Baku will likely move to strengthen its ties with Ankara (even as
Moscow remains a major trading partner). That does not mean, however, that
Azerbaijan will allow Turkey to establish military bases on its soil, since such
a move would jeopardize Baku’s relations with Moscow.
For now, Azerbaijan and Armenia are trying to balance their
relations with the West while also staying close to the Russian Federation.
Neither Baku nor Yerevan has imposed sanctions on Moscow, and the two nations
carefully avoid condemning Russian actions in Ukraine.
Their peoples, however, have taken part in rallies
supporting Ukraine, with larger crowds gathered in Baku than in Yerevan.
Officially, Armenia and Azerbaijan remain neutral in the conflict, and both
hope that fighting does not spill over into the Caucasus. But if Russia does
not quickly achieve its military and political goals in Ukraine, it may demand
that its CSTO allies enter the fight. There are already fears in Ukraine that
Russia will involve CSTO in the war, while in Armenia, some political analysts
expect the Kremlin to pressure Yerevan and other allies to deploy troops to the
Donbas, where they would play the role of peacekeepers.
Azerbaijan is unlikely to become involved in Russian
military operations, despite the agreement that the two countries recently
signed. For now, the document remains aspirational, unlike the Susha
Declaration, which has been ratified by Azerbaijan’s parliament. Thus, close
ties with Turkey will allow Azerbaijan to avoid being used as an instrument by
the Kremlin. It will also, much to Putin’s dismay, further complicate his
calculus in Ukraine.
The writer is a political analyst in Serbia. His work
focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with
special attention on energy and “pipeline politics”. ©Syndication Bureau, www.syndicationbureau.com
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