Much has been written about the European
Union’s confused and cacophonic response to the heinous Oct. 7 Hamas terrorist
attack that has plunged the Middle East into one of the most violent crises the
region has known since World War II.
اضافة اعلان
While the condemnation of Hamas’ atrocities
was unanimous, not much else was. European Commission President Ursula von der
Leyen has been criticized — including by her own staff — for her unconditional
support for Israel, even if her position has subsequently evolved as the number
of Palestinian casualties has continued to rise. In a rushed attempt to signal
a policy change, shortly after the attack Hungarian EU Commissioner for
Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations Olivér Várhelyi announced the halting
of all EU “payments” to the Palestinians — a move that was later retracted. The
EU development portfolio, amounting to hundreds of millions of euros, was put
under review, but in recent weeks Brussels has actually stepped up its
humanitarian assistance.
Other European leaders have tried, right from
the outset, to articulate a message that looks at Israel’s retaliation as just
one side of the equation. French President Emmanuel Macron, for instance, has
proposed to widen the scope of the anti-ISIL coalition to fight Hamas — an
initiative that has not gained traction. Notably, he has simultaneously called
for a “decisive relaunch” of the Middle East peace process and subsequently
been very vocal about the need for an end to the Israeli bombing campaign and a
ceasefire.
As the scale of Israel’s wide-ranging military
operations has become clear, many EU leaders have expressed concern about the
number of civilian lives lost, although not all European governments have
joined the growing international chorus blasting Israel for what is widely
criticized as a disproportionate response.
In a laudable effort to delineate the EU
position early on, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy Josep Borrell has insisted on some basic tenets: Israel’s right of
self-defense and Europe’s full solidarity in the fight against Hamas; the need
for Israel’s response to be commensurate and compliant with international
humanitarian law; the absolute necessity of preventing a wider conflict; the
imperative of avoiding a further exacerbation of the humanitarian situation;
and a reaffirmation of Europe’s long-standing commitment to a diplomatic
solution based on two states. As Arab public opinion and wide segments of the
European public have rushed to denounce alleged European and Western double
standards, Borrell was among the first (and few) international leaders to go on
record calling the total siege of Gaza a violation of international law (as a
result of this and other positions, some EU member states have taken exception
to Borrell’s proactive approach)
Europe’s “powerlessness” may be rather due to the fact that as power games have become mainstream in relations among Israelis, Palestinians, and regional actors, Europe’s traditional insistence on a comprehensive, inclusive, and balanced approach has lost much of its appeal.
Towards the end of October, European views
seemed to coalesce around a balanced approach, with strong impetus from the
Spanish Presidency. The long-negotiated text of the Oct. 26 European Council
statement finally called for “humanitarian corridors and pauses for
humanitarian needs” — something Israel has later implemented, albeit in a
limited way and with narrow modalities that have been criticized — while
reiterating Israel’s right to defend itself “in line with international law.”
Yet just days later Europe’s internal divisions were again on full display as
EU countries split on a U.N. General Assembly resolution calling for a
humanitarian truce. Several EU member states felt compelled to vote against or
abstain on a text that did not mention Hamas.
Europe’s
divisions have deepened as the Middle East peace process collapsed
The truth of the matter is that after being an
early advocate of the two-state solution and crafting successful diplomatic
initiatives towards a negotiated settlement, such as the 1991 Madrid
Conference, in more recent years Europe has struggled to keep its unity — and
more crucially to maintain its influence — on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
As the Middle East peace process progressively stalled and Palestinian and
Israeli politics drifted away from the middle ground, intra-EU divisions
deepened, with some European countries distancing themselves from the
Palestinian cause — the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 and the ossification of
the Palestinian Authority being two reasons — while others focused their
attention on the dangerous rise of political extremism in Israel.
Well before the current crisis, EU countries
conspicuously split in 2011 over the UNESCO initiative to admit Palestine as a
member. In 2012, they divided over the U.N. General Assembly vote according
Palestine non-member observer state status. In a break from the previous
record, since the mid-2010s, the EU has been struggling to speak with one voice
on the nature of Israeli settlements. In the run-up to the current war, there
was talk of “de-Europeanization” of Middle East policy even as in other areas,
notably the war in Ukraine, EU leaders had seemed to live up to the
self-declared ambition of turning the Union into a coherent geopolitical actor.
Faced with a crisis for which Hamas bears full
responsibility and blame but at the same time is also the tragic epilogue of a
process of progressive side-tracking of the Palestinian question, European
divisions reflect the receding space for common ground and the triumph of
self-interest, a trend that has affected not only Israeli politics but has
marked the strategies of key Arab actors in recent years as well. While these
divisions have certainly weakened Europe’s ability to influence regional
developments, they do not yet fully explain its growing irrelevance. Europe’s
“powerlessness” may be rather due to the fact that as power games have become
mainstream in relations among Israelis, Palestinians, and regional actors,
Europe’s traditional insistence on a comprehensive, inclusive, and balanced
approach has lost much of its appeal.
A
possible EU niche between power politics and powerlessness
The question then becomes whether the ongoing
war, in that it represents the failure of the politics of opportunism that a
growing number of actors have subscribed to in recent years, may open a niche
for the EU. For their part, countries that have played hard ball in recent
years, either by supporting Palestinian extremism or endorsing initiatives —
signally the Abraham Accords — that contributed to shifting the focus to the
geopolitical confrontation with Iran, are now potentially more exposed to the consequences
of the crisis.
As societies across the Arab world and beyond
sympathize with the suffering of the Palestinians, countries that in recent
years have normalized relations with Israel without preconditions find
themselves in a tough spot. For its part, having supported the Abraham Accords
over two consecutive administrations and being Israel’s key military ally, the
U.S. can exert great influence on crucial dossiers — from the release of the
hostages to avoiding a regional escalation — but is no longer in a position to
play the same role of honest broker it performed back in the 1990s. The coming
2024 U.S. presidential elections will further complicate the Biden
administration’s balancing act as progressives are increasingly calling to rein
in Israel while Republicans that are becoming more tepid towards U.S.
assistance for Ukraine want to see even more U.S. support for America’s Middle
East ally.
The EU’s narrow, thankless, but crucial task
going forward is to navigate this fractured and increasingly polarized
environment, seizing the opportunities — small and big — that may open up to
revamp diplomatic dialogue, turning the international backlash against Hamas
into a possible creative moment. Although the two-state solution may look as
remote as ever at present, Europe should seize upon Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s recent statements that Israel does not intend to occupy or govern
Gaza after the conflict to proactively outline a process in which the objective
of successfully isolating and defeating Hamas is linked to a resumption of
peace talks.
For the time being, Europe’s challenge has
stemmed not only from internal divisions but also from its limited initiative,
even as the U.S., Qatar, and other regional actors have worked to broker recent
deals on hostage release and humanitarian support. Yet Europe’s repeated calls
for an international conference should not be dismissed as wishful thinking.
While EU leaders are all too aware that any successful process will have to
rely on regional ownership, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez and President
Macron are right in advocating, among others, that the EU offer its own formats
— like France successfully did with the Nov. 9 high-level international
gathering on humanitarian aspects of the crisis on the margins of the Paris
Peace Forum. This and similar future initiatives will allow the EU to play the
role of extra-regional host, relieving some of the pressure on regional actors
and mobilizing much-needed international financial support for the region.
- As Israel’s main trading partner and Palestine’s largest international donor, the EU has clear leverage and can use carrots and sticks more effectively going forward, for instance by pushing for an opening of the political process in the West Bank
When it comes to its own direct engagement,
the EU should not only review the composition and beneficiaries of its aid for
Palestine but also revise the mandate of its civilian missions in the region,
pairing the focus on state building with human capacity building. Together with
tailored track II and track 1.5 diplomatic initiatives, the EU could play an
important role in engaging and supporting a new cohort of Palestinian and
Israeli youth leaders drawn closer by a common desire to escape the spiral of
violence that the politics of intransigence has fueled.
In this context, elements of the Abraham
Accords could be appreciated and possibly even strengthened by an EU that has
been from the outset fairly tepid towards this U.S.-supported initiative.
Together with the focus on the regional threat posed by a revisionist Iran, the
Abraham Accords have had the notable merit of adopting a forward-looking
approach, exploring much-needed synergies for economic growth and technological
development without which parts of the region are destined to face the
challenges of stagnation and underdevelopment.
As Israel’s main trading partner and
Palestine’s largest international donor, the EU has clear leverage and can use
carrots and sticks more effectively going forward, for instance by pushing for
an opening of the political process in the West Bank, or by further reviewing
the issue of Israeli settlements in the context of economic and trade relations
with Israel. Overall, the EU should try to change as much as possible the
underlying incentive structure for both parties in the direction of revamped
diplomatic engagement, signaling that a return to a stalemated peace process
after the defeat of Hamas would only spell new, larger crises down the road.
For Europe, the revival of diplomacy is not only a foreign policy goal but a
domestic issue as sizable segments of the European public are calling for a
course correction and may become an important factor in various upcoming
elections.
As a matter of fact, a clear focus of the EU
should be domestic. While doubling down on efforts to combat both anti-Semitism
and Islamophobia — both of which are on the rise — a positive agenda should
involve intensified people-to-people contact, bringing together stakeholders
behind the vision of a common destiny. That is why it is important that
migration policies should not be further tightened as some are already
proposing. Strengthened border checks and anti-terrorism activities should go
hand in hand with expanded opportunities for Palestinians desiring to move to
the EU for educational or professional reasons. Ambitious recent initiatives
such as Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa, focused as they are on creating local
opportunities for development while at the same time leveraging labor migration
where possible, could have a prominent Middle East and North Africa chapter in
light of recent developments.
Among other challenges, the EU faces the
problem of more limited leverage towards Arab countries due to its increased
energy dependence on the region as a result of its weaning off from Russia
fossil fuels. The focus should therefore be on positive sum game partnerships,
with economic cooperation and technological transfer supporting the twin goals
of coexistence and shared prosperity. This could start with mitigating the
growing impact of climate change on issues like soil degradation and water
scarcity in the MENA region, which would add a whole new meaning to the old
“land for peace” formula.
Emiliano
Alessandri is a non-resident scholar with MEI and an expert on
Euro-Mediterranean relations with a focus on North Africa. Domènec Ruiz Devesa
is a Spanish member of the European Parliament and a Vice Chairman of the EP
delegation on relations with Iraq. The opinions expressed in this article are
strictly their own.
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