When the Ukrainian military made rapid
advances in its autumn campaign, the fears of Russian nuclear retaliation were
connected to a long-standing American interpretation of Russian strategic
theory: “escalate to de-escalate”, the idea of using a limited nuclear strike
to raise the stakes of conflict so high that your enemies see no choice but to
bargain, regardless of their conventional advantages.
اضافة اعلان
In the months since, the return to a war of
attrition and various Russian disavowals have eased nuclear anxieties somewhat.
But an “escalate to de-escalate” theory remains relevant to the situation in
Ukraine, because it seems to inform both the US and Russian strategies —
conventional, not nuclear — for the spring campaign.
Note that I said US strategy and not
Ukrainian. Ukraine’s desired strategy remains what it has been, understandably
enough, for the entire war: escalate to win. Kyiv wants as many weapons as the
West can send, it wants to reclaim every inch of territory, and it does not
want to entertain terms that would concede anything to the invading Russians.
This attitude is shared by many hawkish
voices in Europe and America, who continue to plan for Ukraine’s triumph and
Vladimir Putin’s overthrow. But it is probably not shared by the Biden
administration, or at least not by the key decision-makers.
Seeking a true armisticeYes, the formal White House position is
that Ukraine will have US support all the way to victory. But the cautious
approach that President Joe Biden and his team have taken to armaments that
might radically change the balance of the war, the nudges encouraging Kyiv to
show openness to negotiation, the concern about investing too heavily at the
expense of our Asian commitments — all of this indicates that the White House’s
proximate goal is a favorable armistice, not complete Russian defeat.
An “escalate to de-escalate” theory remains relevant to the situation in Ukraine, because it seems to inform both the US and Russian strategies… for the spring campaign.
To get to that imagined peace, though, you
need to convince the Russians that a true armistice — as opposed to another
“frozen conflict”, in which warfare dies down but peace is never formally
established — is in their interests, that if they keep the war simmering they
will continue losing men and materiel at a brutal, regime-destabilizing pace.
One hope was that the Ukrainian
counteroffensive last fall and Europe’s so-far successful endurance of the
winter months would be decisive in pushing Moscow toward accepting this
reality, and even toward elaborating its own proposals (no doubt unrealistic
ones at first) for a negotiated settlement.
But instead, the Russians seem to be not
just digging in but also girding for their own renewed offensive. Which
explains, in turn, why the Biden White House and our European allies are
cautiously — and with a certain amount of Germanic hesitancy — turning up the
dial of escalation, enabling an increase in tanks and heavy armor flowing into
Ukraine.
So far, this is not a policy designed to
completely overwhelm a Russian mobilization or drive the Russians out of
Ukraine. It is a policy seemingly intended to blunt any new offensive, to
potentially make the Russians lose more ground, and to show Moscow that it
cannot win a grinding war any more easily than it initially hoped to win a
short one. It is an escalation that assumes the Russians need a little more
convincing, and then they will be open to the de-escalation that we have not
been able to achieve.
But a similar logic also seems to be
driving the Russian strategy — to the extent that we can see through the dark
glass between us and Russian intentions, that is.
From the assumed Russian perspective,
Ukrainian gains in the fall and European resilience in the winter have made
military success only more urgent. There is no point in elaborating peace
proposals so long as the Ukrainians are convinced that they can win a total
victory, and they are more convinced of that than ever.
Escalating to de-escelateSo only once that hope is broken by force
of arms can a settlement acceptable to Moscow begin to emerge. Which makes it
necessary to prove militarily that stalemate is absolutely the best that Kyiv
can hope for, that US and European support may suffice to hold ground but not
to sweepingly reclaim it. And such proof can be delivered only through
escalation, with de-escalation hopefully waiting on the other side.
Hawks will object to this analysis by
noting that we have no proof Russia actually wants real de-escalation at any
stage short of conquest. (Hence the hawkish case for a more maximal,
regime-change-oriented US commitment.) Doves will object that I am
overestimating the Biden White House’s real desire to reach a settlement and
underestimating how much US policy is being set by war fever,
military-industrial imperatives, or a decaying liberalism’s romance with a
distant nationalism. (Hence the dovish case for reducing or refusing further
military aid to Kyiv.)
But the reason to see the situation in the
terms I have described, with both Washington and Moscow imagining themselves
escalating toward a peace settlement, is that it is such a historically
familiar situation. A war breaks out, it is expected to end swiftly but a
stalemate ensues instead, and both sides become convinced that increasing their
commitment to the conflict will bring it to a swifter end on more favorable
terms.
From the assumed Russian perspective, Ukrainian gains in the fall and European resilience in the winter have made military success only more urgent.
This mutual conviction is not a matter of
romance or fantasy or simple folly (though of course those forces enter in).
Instead, escalation is embraced as a coldly logical decision, as the only
reasonable course.
And out of such rationality, you get closer
to the irrationality of fighting for years in a war that neither side can fully
hope to win.
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