The summer of war in Ukraine, while brutal
for soldiers and civilians on the front lines, has been experienced from afar
as a stalemate, depressing enough in its grinding sameness to slip out of
American headlines for a time.
اضافة اعلان
Fall and winter
will be different, supplying answers to the two questions that will determine
the duration of the war. First, how much territory can Ukraine liberate from
Russian occupation? Second, how grim and desperate will the European winter be
with normal Russian energy supplies cut off, and what political consequences
will follow?
We are at the
beginning of both stories. The long-promised Ukrainian counteroffensive is
finally under way — at one end of the front line, a sudden and dramatic thrust
eastward from around Ukrainian-held Kharkiv, and at the other, a slower advance
toward occupied Kherson, Russia’s only major beachhead west of the Dnieper
River. The Kharkiv offensive has seemingly thrown the occupiers into disarray,
liberating important towns and territories and sowing dismay and fury on the Russian
side.
At the same time,
the Russian answer to Ukrainian courage and Western armaments is about to take
full effect. The Nord Stream 1 pipeline is shut down, Europe’s leaders are
scrambling to prepare for a potential $2 trillion surge in energy costs, and
everyone is trying to predict the consequences — from a shallow recession to a
“full stop” that threatens deindustrialization, from stiff-upper-lip support
for Ukraine to populist rebellion.
In wartime, there
is a dynamic relationship between events on the front and the political
situation behind the lines. Some Western pessimists, conditioned by years of
elite failure, expect the European homefront to be the crucial theater, the
place where hawkish hubris generates domestic rebellion against an open-ended
commitment to Ukraine.
This is certainly
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hope, but my guess is that the interaction
will run the other way — that events on the battlefield will be decisive,
determining how the war is experienced politically in Germany, France, or the
Britain of King Charles III.
If Ukraine
continues to make military progress, if outright Russian defeat seems within
reach, Europe will be able to endure its winter of discontent without an
anti-war rebellion. On the other hand, if Ukrainian advances stall out and the
war seems destined for a multiyear stalemate, then the Western political
establishment will be forced to push harder for peace, or else find itself
pushed out from below.
Some Western pessimists, conditioned by years of elite failure, expect the European homefront to be the crucial theater, the place where hawkish hubris generates domestic rebellion against an open-ended commitment to Ukraine.
There were already
good reasons to hope for progress before the apparent Ukrainian breakthroughs.
Although Putin’s government seems to be weathering the sanctions, Moscow is
unwilling or unable to launch a general mobilization, it has obvious
difficulties with munitions and morale, and the traditional Russian advantage
in winter combat does not apply to a situation where it is the Russians
themselves who are the invading power.
So, it is plausible
to imagine a positive military-political feedback loop, where consistent
Ukrainian gains shore up European resolve and carry the de facto alliance
through the winter into a better 2023.
But there is a
range of scenarios within this hoped-for future, and each presents dilemmas
where realism and pessimism may be as important as optimism and resolve.
In the best-case military
scenario, where the Russians end up retreating pell-mell from the current front
lines, the danger is that desperation might push Moscow toward nuclear
brinkmanship — especially given the Russian strategic posture that envisions
using tactical nuclear weapons to reverse battlefield defeats.
As the US learned
to its cost in the Korean War, when our push to the Yalu River reaped an
unexpected Chinese intervention, the question of how far a victorious army
should push is not an easy one, and whether in Crimea or the Donbas, there may
be a line that is perilous to cross.
Alternatively,
there is a scenario where a Ukrainian counteroffensive goes some distance but
still stalls out well short of the prewar lines of control. For instance, the
Ukrainians might push the Russians back to the Dnieper, liberating Kherson, but
find themselves unable to reclaim territory on the east side of the river. In
that kind of situation, with victories followed by a return to stalemate, the
arguments for seeking a ceasefire would be strengthened — not out of any
optimism about Moscow as a partner in peace, but to keep Western support on a
sustainable and balanced footing, and to give Ukraine space for economic and
demographic recovery.
Throughout the war,
the immediate policies of Ukraine hawks have been mostly vindicated even as
their long-term strategy has remained more doubtful. This is likely to be the
season where that gap closes, where the speculative becomes reality, and we
learn more about what war in the longer term will mean.
In which case we should hope both for rapid Ukrainian
advances, and for wisdom, care, and caution to accompany any victories they may
win.
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