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The need to evaluate performance
By Yusuf Mansur, Jordan News
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Ministerial Cabinets tend to have a short life span in Jordan. Many times the
performance is measured by public opinion without quantification of performance
outcomes. As such, the provision of key performance indicators has become an
absolute necessity. Below are some examples.اضافة اعلان
A measure of the success or failure of a Cabinet is oftentimes accomplished by comparing the change in the real per capita income (the average income with the inflation removed). It is neither a perfect nor sufficient measure in itself. So, let us look at the period 2009-2018, a fascinating decade.
(Photo: Freepik)
The reason 2009 is selected is due to the fact that it was the year that followed the 2008 global economic crisis, and the start of the low economic growth rates era for Jordan. The 2018 is chosen because it is the end date of the last pre-pandemic government.
In order to make some assessment, the 2009-2018 period is divided into several intervals, the first of which is the pre-Arab Spring and Refugees (ASR) interval, 2009-2011. During those years, the real per capita income was falling at an average rate of 1.8 percent annually. In fact, 2010 witnessed the highest drop (-2.9 percent) in the real per capita income during the whole period (and even in the pandemic year of 2020).
The second interval, which spanned almost four years, 2012-2015 and almost half of 2016, was the interval during which the Abdullah Ensour Cabinet was in office. During that period, the real per capita income was falling at around 2 percent annually, the greatest drop throughout the 2009-2018 period.
The third interval was 2016-2018, the almost two-year period during which the Hani Mulqi Cabinet was in office. Interestingly, the drop in real per capita income was an average -0.4 percent annually, the lowest throughout the 2009-2018 period.
Moreover, the annual changes in the real per capita income tell a thought-provoking story. In 2016, the fall in the real per capita income was -1.0 percent – following the Ensour Cabinet, the Mulqi Cabinet had been in office for only six months. In 2017, the drop in the real per capita income was reduced to -0.3 percent, the lowest drop in the real per capita income throughout the period.
In 2018, the negative trend was reversed, the real per capita income was actually rising; it grew by +0.1 percent, the only positive growth rate during 2009-2018, which also signaled a return to positive real growth rates in the average income, a welcome development.
Did the change in the real per capita income come at the expense of a rising or falling debt level? One way to measure the public debt is to compare it to the GDP (that is, the debt-to-GDP ratio) during 2009-2018.
The 2009-2011 interval suffered a growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 65 percent to 71 percent. The 2012-2015 interval saw a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 71 percent to 92 percent. During the 2016-2018 interval, the debt-to-GDP ratio held constant at 92 percent.
The above is only a sample of what should be done to evaluate the performance of the various ministerial Cabinets. It is provided as an example of what can be done, which is much more.
The writer is CEO of the Envision Consulting Group and former minister of state for economic affairs.
Read more Opinion and Analysis
A measure of the success or failure of a Cabinet is oftentimes accomplished by comparing the change in the real per capita income (the average income with the inflation removed). It is neither a perfect nor sufficient measure in itself. So, let us look at the period 2009-2018, a fascinating decade.
(Photo: Freepik)
The reason 2009 is selected is due to the fact that it was the year that followed the 2008 global economic crisis, and the start of the low economic growth rates era for Jordan. The 2018 is chosen because it is the end date of the last pre-pandemic government.
In order to make some assessment, the 2009-2018 period is divided into several intervals, the first of which is the pre-Arab Spring and Refugees (ASR) interval, 2009-2011. During those years, the real per capita income was falling at an average rate of 1.8 percent annually. In fact, 2010 witnessed the highest drop (-2.9 percent) in the real per capita income during the whole period (and even in the pandemic year of 2020).
The second interval, which spanned almost four years, 2012-2015 and almost half of 2016, was the interval during which the Abdullah Ensour Cabinet was in office. During that period, the real per capita income was falling at around 2 percent annually, the greatest drop throughout the 2009-2018 period.
The third interval was 2016-2018, the almost two-year period during which the Hani Mulqi Cabinet was in office. Interestingly, the drop in real per capita income was an average -0.4 percent annually, the lowest throughout the 2009-2018 period.
Moreover, the annual changes in the real per capita income tell a thought-provoking story. In 2016, the fall in the real per capita income was -1.0 percent – following the Ensour Cabinet, the Mulqi Cabinet had been in office for only six months. In 2017, the drop in the real per capita income was reduced to -0.3 percent, the lowest drop in the real per capita income throughout the period.
In 2018, the negative trend was reversed, the real per capita income was actually rising; it grew by +0.1 percent, the only positive growth rate during 2009-2018, which also signaled a return to positive real growth rates in the average income, a welcome development.
Did the change in the real per capita income come at the expense of a rising or falling debt level? One way to measure the public debt is to compare it to the GDP (that is, the debt-to-GDP ratio) during 2009-2018.
The 2009-2011 interval suffered a growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 65 percent to 71 percent. The 2012-2015 interval saw a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 71 percent to 92 percent. During the 2016-2018 interval, the debt-to-GDP ratio held constant at 92 percent.
The above is only a sample of what should be done to evaluate the performance of the various ministerial Cabinets. It is provided as an example of what can be done, which is much more.
The writer is CEO of the Envision Consulting Group and former minister of state for economic affairs.
Read more Opinion and Analysis
