While the world remains focused on
de-escalating the Israel-Hamas war and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine,
Turkey’s attention is increasingly on gaining a foothold in former Soviet
republics of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
اضافة اعلان
Shared culture provides the rationale for
closer ties. Trade and security deals, negotiated with the
Organization of Turkic States (OTS), offer the motivation.
At last week’s OTS summit, in the Kazakh
capital of Astana, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that it’s the
Turkic language that bonds Turkey with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Echoing calls for a common Turkic alphabet, the
Turkish leader said language enabled the countries’ unity.
Although largely symbolic, the plea was a
message to
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to abandon Cyrillic, which forms the basis
of the Russian script, in favor of the Latin alphabet, which was adopted by
Turkey in 1928. Ankara’s ally Azerbaijan made the transition in 2001, a move
viewed clearly as a repudiation of former Soviet rule. Turkmenistan, an OTS
observer, switched to Latin script even earlier, in the 1990s.
Of course for Turkey, the organization is more
than a bloc for creating a common script. Rather, it’s an emerging instrument
that could help Turkey crowd Russia out of the South Caucasus and Central Asia,
strategically important regions where Turkic-speaking people make up most of
the population.
At last week’s OTS summit, in the Kazakh capital of Astana, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that it’s the Turkic language that bonds Turkey with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
The big question is whether other members
share Turkey’s ambition. Evidence to date suggests they may not.
For instance, one of Turkey’s goals is to
convince OTS nations to support the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Recognized only by Turkey, TRNC is considered by the international community to
be part of the Republic of Cyprus. Like Turkmenistan, TRNC is an observer state
to OTS.
The Organization of Turkic States members,
meanwhile, appear split on their stance toward TRNC. Unlike at the previous OTS
summit in Ankara in March, where the Turkish-Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar was
treated like a head of state, in Astana last week, there was no official TRNC
presence.
Other
geopolitical matters are even more divisive
Despite being allies, Turkey and Azerbaijan have
diametrically opposed attitudes on the Israel-Gaza conflict. While Azerbaijan's
people openly support Israel – and Baku supplies Israel with 60 percent of its
oil needs –
Erdogan spews anti-Israel rhetoric.
Trade corridors are another point of
contention. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey share an interest in a quick
realization of the Middle Corridor project, a transportation route starting
from Southeast Asia and China, running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and on to Europe.
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, have
supported Russia’s plans to build the Southern Transport Corridor, which would
effectively bypass Kazakhstan.
What most, if not all, former Soviet
Turkic-speaking countries have in common is a desire to leave Russia’s zone of
influence.
Kazakhstan is looking to develop closer ties
with neighboring Turkic states and the West, giving Turkey an opening for
engagement. Kyrgyzstan is also in play. Despite being Russia's ally in the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), it has recently purchased
Turkish-made Akinci and Aksungur drones, which are used for border security.
Kyrgyzstan already has Turkish-made Bayraktar
unmanned aerial vehicles; it reportedly used them against Tajikistan during a
2022 border clash.
Despite being allies, Turkey and Azerbaijan have diametrically opposed attitudes on the Israel-Gaza conflict. While Azerbaijan's people openly support Israel – and Baku supplies Israel with 60 percent of its oil needs – Erdogan spews anti-Israel rhetoric.
Beyond military hardware, Turkey is also using
economic cooperation to entice engagement with the former Soviet Central Asian
republics. For instance, Ankara aims to reach a $10-billion bilateral trade
target with Kazakhstan, while Turkish companies' investments in Uzbekistan have
already reached $1.5 billion.
But the problem for Ankara is that OTS members
are land-locked countries heavily dependent on Russian geography. For instance,
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas
pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. As
long as Russia remains an important transit country for the Turkic world’s
energy resources, Turkey’s bid to supplant Russia in the region will be a tall
order.
The fact is that OTS members from the
post-Soviet space need Russia as much as they aspire to increase ties with
Turkey. Each remains integrated into the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of
Independent States, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain part of the Moscow-led
Eurasian Economic Union, as well as the CSTO.
These alignments suggest that for most Turkic
states, Turkey’s vision of an Ankara-led Turkic world order is overly myopic.
Erdogan might see it in simple terms of letters on a piece of paper, but for
Turkey’s brethren in former Soviet republics, the final chapter with Moscow has
yet to be written.
Nikola
Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses mostly on the
foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention on
energy and pipeline politics. X: @nikola_mikovic
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