What started in the
autumn as the small, hesitant steps of reluctant dance partners has exploded in
pace over the past few weeks, as Turkey and Syria begin open moves toward some
form of reconciliation.
اضافة اعلان
A few months ago,
it was reported that the intelligence heads of both countries had held multiple meetings, encouraged by
Russia. In recent weeks, those meetings have increased, accompanied by a chorus
of players from the region.
Just last week,
a Russian presidential envoy was in
Damascus to meet the Syrian president, followed a day later by Iran’s foreign
minister appearing in the city. A week earlier, the United Arab Emirates’
foreign minister was received by Bashar Al Assad. Two weeks before that,
defense ministers from Turkey and Syria had met in Moscow. The new year has
brought a flurry of activity from all sides with an interest in the decade-long
conflict.
Like a shotgun wedding, bringing Damascus and Ankara back into an embrace will hurt a lot of bystanders.
The attempted
reconciliation is real, driven by the major impetus of the Ukraine war and the
smaller one of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s spring election. So powerful
are the forces driving the two countries together that they will almost
certainly find a way to do it, papering over their all-too-real divisions. But
those divisions are not going anywhere. Like a shotgun wedding, bringing
Damascus and Ankara back into an embrace will hurt a lot of bystanders.
Russia and the refugees
On the surface, the
contours of the disagreements between the two countries are clear. As Syria’s
Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad said last week, “we cannot talk
about resuming normal ties with Turkey without removing the occupation”.
The “occupation” is
what Damascus calls the parts of northern Syria policed by Turkish soldiers.
These borderlands are vital for Turkey. They house the majority of Syrian
opposition forces and are critical to what Ankara hopes will be a partial
resolution to the simmering tension of Turkey sheltering millions of Syrian
refugees. Erdogan’s plan is to move the refugees back into areas of Syrian
territory, but policed by Turkey. Finding a creative way to keep some of these
areas will be essential to his pitch to voters.
At least some of
that will be on the table in any future negotiations with Damascus over normal
ties. That much has been known for years. But what is different this time is
the political opportunity afforded by the Ukraine war.
With Russia
stretched by the conflict, it needs to redirect some of its forces away from
Syria. With that, Iran sees an opportunity to fill the vacuum vacated by these
troops.
For years, Russia,
because of its air superiority, has played an unusual balancing role between
Iran and Israel; at times shielding Syria from Israeli attacks, at times
allowing Iran to move against Israel. If Russia’s footprint is lessened, Daesh
could have more space to operate. Hence why, in Beirut last week, Hossein
Amirabdollahian, Iran’s foreign minister, publicly welcomed the possibility of reconciliation.
For Turkey, making
peace — or some semblance of peace — with Damascus could be dangerous. The
Syrian opposition that now mainly lives under Turkish protection could
disappear into Turkey and may even seek revenge for that betrayal. Yet the
political price of millions of Syrian refugees languishing within Turkey’s
borders is too high. Moreover, if Russia is committed to leaving, Turkey would
prefer a draw-down that does not leave Iranian operatives with free rein.
The tensions that
will remain
All of these
complex calculations are having to be made at speed, after years in which the
pace of political contacts was glacial. This, then, is the underlying tension
driving the rapid rapprochement: Russia’s weakness because of Ukraine has
created too enticing a political opportunity.
Frankly, the status
quo suited Damascus and Ankara — Damascus could fulminate about a Turkish
“occupation” but did not need to do anything and could continue retrenching its
control over the populated eastern cities it really cares about. Ankara too
could use the years of froideur to build up its infrastructure along
the border and push Kurdish populations away from it. The long cold suited both
sides.
No amount of rapprochement can change the fundamental problem of the Assad regime: its lack of legitimacy.
But Russia’s war in
Ukraine has thawed the conflict and all sides are now rushing to work out what
they can salvage from it. The end result is almost predictable — more spaces in
Syria back under the control of the regime, more Syrians deported from Turkey,
more room for Iranian forces to operate inside Syrian territory, and more Kurds
pushed from the borders. If and when some form of cooperation is agreed, the
headline handshake will overshadow the underlying tensions.
But these tensions
are not going anywhere. No amount of rapprochement can change the fundamental
problem of the Assad regime: its lack of legitimacy. No agreement that keeps
millions of Syrians beyond its border permanently, or forces them to return to
an uncertain future, can be workable.
In the head-long
rush to an embrace, these differences will be papered over, or pushed to some
indeterminate future. But those seeking an end to the disagreement between
Syria and Turkey should heed the lessons that brought about its beginning: the
more the Syrian state sought to paper over the cracks of the society, the more
they created the conditions for an explosion.
Faisal Al Yafai is
currently writing a book on the Middle East and is a frequent
commentator on international TV news networks. He has worked for news outlets
such as The Guardian and the BBC, and reported on the Middle East, Eastern Europe,
Asia, and Africa. Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai. Copyright: Syndication
Bureau.
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