Central Asia and the South Caucasus have long been within
Russia’s geopolitical orbit. But as the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine stumbles on,
Turkey is looking to take advantage by increasing its influence in the
strategically important regions.
اضافة اعلان
It’s no secret Ankara views Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as countries that belong to the Turkic
world — an idea that former Turkish President Abdullah Gul once formulated as “One nation, six states”. Yet cultural ties are not what
drives his successor, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, now. Today, it is all about
energy.
Turkey’s ties to Turkmenistan are particularly important.
Despite not being a member of the Organization of Turkic States — an
influential regional grouping of Turkic-speaking countries — Turkmenistan
plays a key role in Ankara’s Central Asia strategy. As Erdogan put it bluntly last month, “I hope that Turkmen gas will
soon begin to flow to Turkey through the Caspian Sea.”
Despite being one of the world’s most isolated regimes, Turkmenistan ranks fourth globally for natural gas reserves after Russia,
Iran, and Qatar. Although China is the main buyer of Turkmen gas at the moment, Ankara aims
to start purchasing energy from the former Soviet republic to help turn Turkey
into a regional gas hub.
Here is how that would work: By investing in the political
and economic conditions needed to import large volumes of natural gas from
Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan, Turkey could redirect energy to
Europe and become an intermediary in gas sales.
While the Kremlin supports this idea in principle — especially
given that it can no longer supply Europe with natural gas via the Nord Stream
pipelines — Turkey’s energy strategy has drawn some Russian opposition. Most
notable is Senator Alexander Bashkin, who wrote recently that Moscow would not allow
construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan,
an essential part of any future linkage to Turkey. Bashkin blamed environmental
concerns for his stance, but the geopolitical subtext was clear.
Still, even if the Kremlin shared Bashkin’s view, it is
unlikely that Moscow has the means to push Turkey off course. Bogged down in
Ukraine, Russia is unable to dictate to other countries, and especially not to
Turkey.
Hypothetically, Moscow could offer its own gas pipelines to
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan for exporting gas to Europe. But given
Russia’s isolation in the global arena, and the fact that President Vladimir
Putin has turned his country into a pariah-state, it is doubtful that the
former Soviet Central Asian republics would be willing to do business with the
Kremlin.
Thus, Ankara will almost certainly continue expanding energy
ties with Turkmenistan, without fear of Russian retaliation.
Turkey is already purchasing energy elsewhere in the region;
Ankara is among the main buyers of Azerbaijan’s natural gas. But because
Azerbaijan’s resources are limited, Ankara still sees Turkmenistan as
the linchpin in its geo-economic strategy.
While energy and economic interests are driving Turkey’s strategy in the post-Soviet space, Erdogan will undoubtedly continue emphasizing the importance of pan-Turkism, given that most Turkic nations share historical, ethnic, and cultural ties with Turkey.
While energy and economic interests are driving Turkey’s
strategy in the post-Soviet space, Erdogan will undoubtedly continue
emphasizing the importance of pan-Turkism, given that most Turkic nations share
historical, ethnic, and cultural ties with Turkey. Pan-Turkism helps Turkey
further its ambitious goals in the Eurasian heartland — namely, to compete with Russia
and China in the countries surrounding the Caspian Sea.
Turkey was the first country in the world to recognize
the independence of the former Soviet Central Asian republics in the
1990s. Ever since, Turkey has maintained close ties to the region, engaging in
economic and educational projects, and enhancing its military cooperation.
Turkey is also making inroads in Kyrgyzstan, opening mosques and schools and strengthening its energy collaboration.
While Kyrgyzstan remains Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), and is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Union (EAEU),
the Kremlin is struggling to preserve its cultural influence in the
country.
In neighboring Kazakhstan — another Russian ally in the CSTO
and the EAEU — Turkey has plans to invest around $2 billion, mostly in light industry.
Ankara’s economic presence in the oil-rich Central Asian nation is modest;
trade between Ankara and Astana was just over $5.3 billion in 2021, while the trade turnover between
Kazakhstan and Russia topped $11.6 billion during the first six months of 2022.
More recently, however, Kazakhstan has shown signs of
distancing itself from Russia as it looks to diversify its
foreign policy. To take advantage, Ankara should move to become a transit point
for Kazakh oil and rare earth metals bound for the EU, and to create an energy corridor connecting Turkey and Central Asia.
Turkey’s timing could be perfect. Kazakhstan is expected
to approve a draft agreement on a transport corridor that
would connect China with the EU through Kazakhstan and Turkey. The
Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, better known as the Middle Corridor,
would bypass Russia and position Turkey as an important transit country.
It will take time to build all these corridors and
pipelines. As Turkey waits for its energy strategy to materialize, expect its
leaders to use every tool at their disposal to achieve the economic and energy
goals they covet in Central Asia.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work
focuses mostly on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine,
with special attention on energy and “pipeline politics.”
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