As international sanctions over the war in Ukraine slow Russia’s growth,
global knock-on effects — from higher gas prices to faster inflation — are easy
to see. Others, like whether the Russian invasion will lead to an end of the
official grouping of emerging economies known colloquially as the BRICS,
require closer examination.
اضافة اعلان
The BRICS —
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — is a political body created
about seven years after I coined the original term in 2001 (with a small ‘s’
for plural rather than a large ‘S’ for South Africa) to represent the changing
economic power drivers of the world economy. They were identified for their
significant influence on developing country affairs, including integration into
the global economy.
Although the central piece of my original thesis was
to highlight the need for representative global governance, the BRICs acronym
garnered acceptance because of the rising economic powers of these countries,
especially China. While leaders of the BRICs were excited by the publicity for
their economic potential, their attraction to the idea of a club was also to
foster political recognition beyond the global institutions dominated by the
US.
The aggregate size of the BRICS countries is dominated by China, which, according to data from the end of 2021, had an economy in nominal dollar terms of about $18 trillion. This is more than six times the size of India’s economy, about 10 times Brazil’s and Russia’s, and some 55 times the size of South Africa’s.
Indeed, it is this initial motivation that keeps
them enthusiastic members today, rather than undertaking any genuine joint
policy development. That impulse will remain regardless of Russia’s military
adventurism, which is why I suspect the BRICS political entity will live on for
quite some time. Whether it matters is another question entirely.
The aggregate size of the BRICS countries is
dominated by China, which, according to data from the end of 2021, had an
economy in nominal dollar terms of about $18 trillion. This is more than six
times the size of India’s economy, about 10 times Brazil’s and Russia’s, and
some 55 times the size of South Africa’s.
Collectively, the BRICS today are worth about $25
trillion, roughly the size of the US economy.
But China is the only BRICS country with an economic
performance that has exceeded the potential anticipated in 2001. India has come
close, but 20 years on, Brazil and Russia have disappointed significantly,
while South Africa has done even worse. In this sense, many economists,
businesspeople, and journalists have stopped paying much attention to the BRICS
nations’ collective actions.
With Chinese involvement, BRICS remain an economic
force, and because of this, it remains feasible that by the mid- to late-2030s,
their collective economic size may become as large as the G6 (the G7 minus
Canada). On the other hand, without China, the collective weight of the others
would be greatly dependent on India achieving its true potential.
Given the current state of affairs, the superficial
awareness grows that the group may find it harder to be truly influential.
I have sometimes joked that, economically at least,
maybe it should be thought of as simply the “ICs”, to symbolize the economic
importance of China and India. Certainly, for Brazil and Russia to justify the
global economic recognition that the BRICs acronym provided, it is time to
start performing dramatically better (which in Russia’s case seems especially
unlikely).
Against this background, let us consider BRICS in
the context of the Russian invasion.
As I wrote in the
Financial Times last November to mark the 20th anniversary of BRICs, the
political club has not undertaken any major joint policy initiative since it
was created, except for the formation of the BRICS Development Bank (now called
the New Development Bank). It is disappointing that, despite the economic
weakness of three members, there has been little appetite for initiatives that
might boost their individual or collective economic performance.
Evidence of this apathy can be seen in India’s
fraught bilateral diplomatic, security, and defense ties with China. Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has yet to attend a single meeting for China’s
much discussed One Belt One Road initiative, snubs that are reflective of
India’s objections to China’s ties to Pakistan. In areas where there could be
exceptional benefits of economic cooperation — such as trade agreements or
infectious disease prevention — BRICS, led by the ICs, has been completely
absent.
Viewed in this context, the political club excels at
symbolism and little else, highlighting the ongoing, deteriorating state of
global governance institutions that I had hoped the BRICS creation might
improve. To be fair, it is also true for other global clubs, both those with
and without BRICS.
Even the G20, which gave the BRICS countries an
individual global voice, has been disappointing since 2008, when it was
instrumental in navigating the global financial crisis.
BRICS’ mixed response to the Russian invasion
highlights the realities of the BRICS group today. While Brazil, India, China,
and South Africa have all refused to criticize Russia’s hostilities in Ukraine
and have not voted against the invasion at the UN, none have done anything to
actively support Russia, either. I doubt this position will change.
As for Russia, which is economically not much bigger
than South Korea, its global slide will continue, unless there are huge
reforms.
President
Vladimir Putin realized long ago that his country could not keep its early
noughties economic boom going, and instead has appealed to the historical and
nationalist tendencies of many Russian citizens to keep his popularity. This
will have long-term negative consequences for Russia. It will also virtually
ensure that the BRICS grouping remains little more than a symbolic shell of
unreached potential.
The
writer is a former chief economist at Goldman Sachs and served as a UK treasury
minister.
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