By joining the West
in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and supporting Ukraine’s military,
Turkey is walking a fine line between two allies – Moscow and Kyiv.
اضافة اعلان
Although last month’s meeting of Ukrainian and
Russian delegations in Istanbul failed to deliver a peace deal, Turkish
policymakers continue to insist that they can facilitate dialogue between the
warring parties. But there is one Turkish political bloc that has adopted a
very different take on the war.
For Turkey’s Eurasianists, Ukraine’s loss is their gain.
“Eurasianism” is a broad term that covers disparate groups including Islamists
and leftist nationalists called “ulusalcis”, many of whom have military
backgrounds. Their ideas center around mistrust of the West, the
romanticization of pan-Turkish history, and championing a strong centrist
Turkish state in a global order aligned with Russia, Iran, China, and the
Turkic countries of Central Asia.
Ever since the 2015 election, when the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority, ultranationalists in
the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and some personalities in the Eurasianist
camp, have had an outsized role in politics.
In “Eurasianism in Turkey”, a new report for the
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, analyst Suat
Kiniklioglu notes that it is not easy to classify a Eurasianist voter because
“not all ulusalcis are Eurasianists and not all ulusalcis support the same
political party”. But it is easy to see their influence.
He writes: “Despite their small numbers and poor
electoral showing, [Eurasianists] have disproportionate influence within the
security bureaucracy and judiciary and are vocal in trying to shape the
strategic debate in Turkey.”
For Dogu Perincek, chairman of the Homeland Party,
that debate looks like this: As Russian tanks rolled across Ukraine’s borders,
Perincek remarked that NATO’s eastward expansion constituted a threat to
Turkey, called the invasion “a Russian weapon that will bring peace and
stability”, and urged the Turkish government to resist imposing “Atlanticist”
sanctions against Russia.
Not long ago, such statements might have drawn more
attention from the ruling AKP, which relied on Eurasianists for support. But
today, due to a confluence of political currents, they are falling on deaf
ears.
A pillar of
Ankara’s foreign policymaking in recent years has been the desire for what can
be called “strategic autonomy” – the ability to act uninfluenced by others.
This concept has so driven Turkish foreign policy that when faced with the threat
of alienation by its neighbors for its inflexible unilateralism in Syria,
Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean, party elites begin to praise the
country’s “sublime loneliness”.
The mix of relative macroeconomic stability and political reform, coupled with the declining role for the US and other historical heavy hitters, has opened a zone of influence for new mediators – a role Turkey looks keen to fill.
Over the past couple of years, however, Turkey has
taken tangible steps to rehabilitate its relations with neighboring states. The
government faces unprecedented high inflation (60 percent, according to
official figures) and rising unemployment coupled with a depreciating currency.
Making gains abroad eases some of the pressure at home and lends credibility to
the ruling party.
Ankara’s new playbook appears to be normalizing ties
with NATO and EU member states, as well as regional allies like the UAE, Israel, and Egypt. The mix of relative macroeconomic stability and
political reform, coupled with the declining role for the US and other
historical heavy hitters, has opened a zone of influence for new mediators – a
role Turkey looks keen to fill.
International condemnation for Russia’s disastrous
war has upended the Eurasianist vision of a regional order led by Turkey and
Russia that challenges Western hegemony. As Turkey readies itself for next
year’s centennial parliamentary and presidential elections, fragile and
tactical domestic alliances will shift. Foreign policy success will be one way
to bolster AKP’s standing across constituencies desperate to see Turkey’s
reputational losses diminish. This in turn could yield economic dividends in
the form of new foreign investment and growth.
While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
continues to rally for UN reform with the slogan, “The world is
more than five”, referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, Turkey’s new foreign policy suggests a strong desire to choose
reintegration with the global order over revisionism.
The wisdom of the Eurasianist grand strategy that
sought to reorient Turkey’s foreign and security policies toward Moscow is
being questioned in Ankara as Vladimir Putin commits one strategic
miscalculation after the other.
But this begets a dilemma: A delicate tightrope runs
between Turkish domestic and foreign politics. Turkish voters across the
political spectrum unite on nationalist urges for an independent Turkey not
beholden to any external actor. Persuading Turkish voters and ultranationalists
working in the state security forces and bureaucracy – including pro-Perincek
groups – of the merits of the AKP’s pivot back to its European and
transatlantic allies may present yet another challenge for the governing party.
The loose pact with Eurasianists was a pragmatic one
for the government to consolidate its grip on power. In ways reminiscent of
Cold War-era bipolarity, Turkey now seems poised to reclaim its role as a key
NATO ally integral to European security. But as the election cycle nears, the
government will amplify the tried and tested “Turkey-first” slogans, being
careful not to alienate voters that are suspicious of American meddling in the
region.
For Turkey’s Eurasianists, the war in Ukraine has
dulled their narrative, but it has not muted it completely.
The
writer is a research fellow and affiliated lecturer at Cambridge University.
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