When news broke this week of the death of Al-Qaeda leader
Ayman Al–Zawahiri in Kabul by a US drone strike, speculation soon began in
neighboring Pakistan over whether the drone that killed him took off from bases
there or passed through the country’s air space.
اضافة اعلان
US-Pakistan counterterrorism cooperation has been
controversial since the early days of the “war on terror”, triggering a
backlash from Islamist politicians, Pashtun tribesmen, and formerly pro-state
extremist militants. It even fomented violent dissent from within the armed
forces.
Today, the US remains unpopular in Pakistan.
Sentiment toward the US is a long way away from the days when prominent
American visitors would be greeted enthusiastically by Pakistani crowds.
And though the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship —
including counterterrorism cooperation — is far more reduced in scope, it has
become entangled with Pakistan’s domestic politics in ways unlike before,
potentially becoming a major electoral factor in Pakistan’s main urban centers.
When prime minister Imran Khan was deposed through a
vote of no confidence in April, he alleged that he was brought down through a
US “regime change” conspiracy, which he claimed was motivated by his firm
opposition to allowing the US to operate military bases in the country.
Many in Pakistan see recent events — including the
army chief’s unusual call with a top US diplomat last week purportedly to
secure quicker approval of the release of an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
loan tranche — as evidence of collusion with the US in ousting Khan as part of
a quid pro quo. Even an anti-Khan talk show host speculated that Pakistan
allowed a “one-time” strike in exchange for help with the IMF.
Pakistan’s struggling economy could surely use all
the help it can get. Official figures put inflation at around 25 percent. The
rupee has been in a free fall, losing around 24 percent in value to the dollar
since Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took power this April. And net foreign
exchange reserves held by Pakistan’s central bank have fallen to $8.39 billion,
covering under two months of imports. The deteriorating economy has
substantially eroded public support for Sharif’s shaky coalition government.
For those keen on linking Pakistan’s economic and
political turmoil to exogenous forces, there are plenty of dots to connect.
Khan’s political troubles intensified in the early months of this year, just as
the US discovered Zawahiri was in Afghanistan. And this summer, as the IMF
adopted a tough posture in talks with Islamabad, the US intelligence community
conclusively identified Zawahiri’s location in Kabul.
Pakistan may be poor. And its economy is in crisis. But it is no tiny country. The US simply cannot get locked in a battle with a populist leader in the world’s fifth-most populous country.
What may simply be coincidental is proof for some of
the US orchestrating Khan’s removal and using various levers of influence to
ensure it has the unimpeded ability to strike high-value targets in landlocked
Afghanistan using Pakistan’s air space. The widely held belief that Khan was
the victim of a US conspiracy feeds into his popular support, increases the
likelihood that he could return to power, and complicates America’s counterterrorism
strategy in the region.
It is very likely that the Zawahiri strike — and
surveillance before and after the attack — involved the use of Pakistani air
space. Indeed, a US congressman has said that Pakistan has given “tacit
approval” to overflight rights.
Now, if US drones did in fact travel through
Pakistan, possibly from a Gulf base, and not a Central Asian neighbor of
Afghanistan, then the killing of Zawahiri not only proves the effectiveness of
the US “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism strategy, but also its reliance on Pakistani air space.
If the US is indeed dependent on Pakistan to surveil
and strike targets in Afghanistan, its counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan
is potentially jeopardized by the return of Khan to power through elections
within the next year. It is vital that the US and Pakistan develop a
counterterrorism cooperation framework that can withstand political pressures
in Pakistan in the short term.
Toward this, the US should maintain a restrained,
focused counterterrorism strategy, quietly partnering with Pakistan without
having bases in the country (if it does not have already). Drone strikes, like
president Bill Clinton used to say of abortion, should be “safe, legal, and
rare”. The two countries should also ramp up intelligence sharing on shared
threats, including Al-Qaeda and the local branch of Daesh.
But Washington must also prepare for the potential
return of Khan to power. It should resist the urge to demonize him as a kind of
Hugo Chavez-style populist strongman and pariah. And it must avoid supporting —
wittingly or otherwise — anti-democratic moves to keep him out of power. Doing
so would put America at loggerheads with the Pakistani street.
Pakistan may be poor. And its economy is in crisis.
But it is no tiny country. The US simply cannot get locked in a battle with a
populist leader in the world’s fifth-most populous country.
Both sides should seek a credible off-ramp should
Khan return to office. But in the end, he may not allow even very limited US
drone overflight rights. And that is a reality the US must be prepared to
accept. It would be Khan’s prerogative as the leader of a sovereign country.
Arif Rafiq is president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, a political risk advisory
company focused on the Middle East and South Asia, and a non-resident scholar
at the Middle East Institute. Twitter: @arifcrafiq. Syndication Bureau.
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